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Article
Reexamining Arbitral Immunity
in an Age of Mandatory
and Professional Arbitration
Maureen A. Weston
t
Arbitration, as a form of private dispute resolution, has
been used for centuries in various commercial and labor-
management sectors. Traditionally, entities with relatively
equal bargaining power used arbitration primarily in special-
ized industries. In the past ten to twenty years, however, arbi-
tration has gained acceptance in other areas, notably proliferat-
ing as a result of mandatory predispute and form arbitration
contracts between corporate entities and their customers, pa-
tients, or employees.' As the use of arbitration has increased,
the need for arbitration services has correspondingly risen and
spawned a market for professional private arbitrators and an
industry of private businesses that provide arbitration support
and administrative services (provider institutions). For exam-
ple, major provider institutions such as the American Arbitra-
tion Association (AAA), National Arbitration Forum (NAF), and
Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services, Inc. (JAMS), con-
t Associate Professor, Pepperdine University School of Law. The Author
would like to thank Professors Stephen K. Huber, David S. Schwartz, and Jay
Folberg, as well as Laurence R. Clarke, Robert Wachtel, and Brian Halloran
for comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
1. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion
Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REv. 931, 969-73 (1999) (de-
scribing the genesis of arbitration in Europe and the United States).
2. See id. at 978. In the early twentieth century, commercial trade asso-
ciations often urged or required arbitration to resolve disputes over contract
interpretation or industry standards between group members. Id.
3. See, e.g., Stephen K. Huber & E. Wendy Trachte-Huber, Top Ten De-
velopments in Arbitration in the 1990s, DiSP. RESOL. J., Nov. 2000-Jan. 2001,
at 26, 30 (describing the "explosion" in consumer arbitration including the ar-
eas of consumer sales and service contracts, insurance claims, medical rela-
tionships, attorney-client disputes, and bank-customer agreements).
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tinue to report growth in caseload and neutral membership.4 In
2002, the AAA administered more than 230,255 cases through
mediation or arbitration.5 In 2001, the AAA reported its sev-
enth consecutive year of growth, with over 218,000 cases ad-
ministered.6 This is up from a caseload of approximately 61,000
between 1991 and 1995.' JAMS likewise reports that its
caseload has increased 2300% from 1987 to 1993.8 The decision
makers operating within the private arbitration industry range
from individual arbitrators operating out of their homes to
multinational corporate provider institutions.9 Arbitrators are
4. The AAA, NAF, JAMS, the Center for Public Resources Institute for
Dispute Resolution (CPR), and the National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD) are among the leading national private alternative dispute resolution
(ADR) service providers. See Jack M. Sabatino, ADR as "Litigation Lite". Pro-
cedural and Evidentiary Norms Embedded Within Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion, 47 EMORY L.J. 1289, 1301-03 (1998). The number of entities operating as
for-profit ADR service providers, including entities such as WebMediate.com
(specializing in administering online arbitrations), has grown tremendously.
While obtaining a complete listing of ADR or arbitration service providers is
difficult, many institutions compile lists of prominent or locally available pro-
viders. See, e.g., ADVANCED DISPUTE RESOLUTION INSTITUTE, ADR
ORGANIZATIONS (listing the major American and international ADR organiza-
tions), at http://adrinstitute.com/library/adr-organizations.htm (last visited
Oct. 12, 2003); AM. BAR ASS'N, CONFLICT RESOLUTION INFORMATION SOURCE
(listing 146 arbitration organizations), at http://www.crinfo.org/
masterresults.cfm?pid=544 (last visited Oct. 12, 2003); AS'N FOR CONFLICT
RESOLUTION NEW ENGLAND CHAPTER, LIST OF ADR PROVIDERS, at
http://www.neacr.org/directory/Names.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2003).
5. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, OVERVIEW, at
http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=15765 (last visited Oct. 12, 2003).
6. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, 2001 PRESIDENT'S LETTERS AND
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS (2001), http://www.adr.org/index2.
ljsp?JSPssid=15705. The large increase in caseloads is attributable in part to
contractual arbitration provisions in the consumer, employment, health care,
and international arbitration arenas, as well as in certain types of cases, such
as collection actions (by the NAF) and no-fault insurance claims. See AM.
ARBITRATION ASS'N, OVERVIEW, supra note 5.
7. See STEPHEN K. HUBER & E. WENDY TRACHTE-HUBER, ARBITRATION:
CASES AND MATERIALS 2 (Aug. 2002 Supplement).
8. See Charles Silver, Does Civil Justice Cost Too Much?, 80 TEX. L. REV.
2073, 2103-04 (2002) (reporting on the increase in private ADR caseloads and
private arbitration providers); Matthew David Disco, Note, The Impression of
Possible Bias: What a Neutral Arbitrator Must Disclose in California, 45
HASTINGS L.J. 113, 138-39 (1993) (noting the rapid increase in revenue for
arbitration providers); Cameron L. Sabin, Note, The Adjudicatory Boat With-
out a Keel: Private Arbitration and the Need for Public Oversight of Arbitra-
tors, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1337, 1340 (2002) (describing exponential caseload
growth for JAMS, the AAA, and the NASD).
9. See, e.g., Stephen Hayford & Ralph Peeples, Commercial Arbitration
in Evolution: An Assessment and Call for Dialogue, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
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not restricted to individuals trained in the law or a particular
area of expertise. Likewise, arbitration provider institutions or
entities have no particular standard for entry.10 Statistics on
the number of private arbitrators are difficult to track, as there
is neither an official registry nor a need for affiliation with a
particular organization. The AAA, however, reports a roster of
over 8000 neutrals in diverse fields and professions that repre-
sent a broad spectrum of expertise." A single Internet search of
"arbitrators" results in a list of over 300,000 entries. The
number, size, and quality of private entities operating as alter-
native dispute resolution (ADR) providers also vary. Provider
institutions can offer an array of arbitration administrative
services, as well as other consulting and training services. In
some cases, a provider organization may have an exclusive con-
tractual arrangement with a company to administer all of the
company's arbitrations or dispute resolution processes; a party
may also unilaterally include a provision in its contracts requir-
ing that all disputes subject to arbitration be filed with a par-
ticular provider organization. 3
RESOL. 343, 362-64 (1995) (discussing the provider's role in arbitration and in
the appointment of arbitrators); Boundaries for Arbitrators, L.A. TIMES, Mar.
16, 2002, at B20 (discussing proposed legislation designed to "eliminate se-
crecy, financial conflicts and excessive fees from mandatory arbitration").
10. Aspirational standards have been developed to guide the conduct and
practice of arbitrators and provider institutions. Compliance with these stan-
dards is voluntary and enforcement is difficult; thus, a party aggrieved of a
violation generally has no legal remedy other than possible vacatur of the un-
derlying award in extreme situations. See infra Part I.A.3 for full discussion.
11. AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, OVERVIEW, supra note 5.
12. An Oct. 12, 2003, Google search of "arbitrators" turned up 334,000 re-
sults, including a variety of entities such as the "Chartered Institute of Arbi-
trators" (www.arbitrators.org), the "Society of Maritime Arbitrators"
(www.smany.org), and the "Society of Construction Arbitrators"
(www.arbitrators-society.org).
13. For example, the exclusive contract between Blue Cross and the AAA
subjects all Blue Cross patient disputes to AAA binding arbitration. See Press
Release, Pamela Pressley, The Foundation for Taxpayer & Consumer Rights,
HMO Forces Arbitrators to Deny Patients Fair Arbitration Process, (May 26,
2000), http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/healthcare/pr/pr000576.php3; see
also Johanna Harrington, Comment, To Litigate or Arbitrate? No Matter-The
Credit Card Industry Is Deciding for You, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 101, 103-04
(noting that credit card companies tend to name specific arbitration providers
in their mandatory arbitration contracts with consumers). Similarly, MCI's
service agreement has a dispute resolution provision which requires the AAA
or JAMS to be the provider organization for arbitration of any disputes under
the agreement. See MCI, GENERAL SERVICE AGREEMENT FOR RESIDENTIAL
CUSTOMERS 26-27 (2003), available at http://consumer.mci.com/
mci-service-agreementres- GSAjsp.
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Arbitration is customarily defined as "a simple proceeding
voluntarily chosen by parties who want a dispute determined
by an impartial judge of their own mutual selection, whose de-
cision, based on the merits of the case, they agree in advance to
accept as final and binding."4 The process is touted as an inex-
pensive, speedy, informal, and private alternative to the judi-
cial system. 5 Whether one agrees that these traditional
characterizations of arbitration have continued vitality in a
prevailing environment of mandatory predispute consumer and
employment arbitration, 6 it is clear that private arbitrators
have significant power to determine not only contractual, but
also statutory and other legal rights and liabilities of the
parties involved, and that judicial review is quite limited.1
7
14. MARLIN M. VOLZ & EDWARD P. GOGGIN, ELKOURI & ELKOURI: How
ARBITRATION WORKS 2 (5th ed. 1997).
15. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 280 (1995)
("The advantages of arbitration are many: it is usually cheaper and faster
than litigation; it can have simpler procedural and evidentiary rules; it nor-
mally minimizes hostility and is less disruptive of ongoing and future business
dealings among the parties...." (quoting H.R. REP. No. 97-542, at 13
(1982))).
16. Empirical research has not necessarily substantiated claims that arbi-
tration costs less than litigation. See PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE COSTS OF
ARBITRATION (summarizing the results of a survey of costs related to arbitra-
tion), at http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7173 (last visited
Oct. 12, 2003) [hereinafter PUBLIC CITIZEN]. This Article does not engage in
the important inquiry of whether predispute mandatory arbitration contracts
should be enforceable, as many others adequately address this ongoing debate.
See, e.g., David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business:
Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration,
1997 WIS. L. REV. 33; Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of
the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of
Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1
(1997). Although most consumer predispute arbitration contracts are arguably
not voluntary or the product of negotiation and consent, Supreme Court
precedent holds that such mandatory arbitration contracts are enforceable,
unless other contractual defenses (such as unconscionability, duress, or fraud)
apply to negate the arbitration contract. See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala.
v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89-90 (2000). This Article focuses on potential re-
course against illegal conduct that occurs in the arbitration process itself.
17. Arbitrators derive their authority from the appointing contract. Sun
Ship, Inc. v. Matson Navigation Co., 785 F.2d 59, 62 (3d Cir. 1986) ("[O]nce
the parties have gone beyond their promise to arbitrate and have supple-
mented the agreement by defining the issue to be submitted to an arbitrator,
courts must look both to the contract and to the submission to determine his
authority."). General clauses requiring arbitration of disputes, however, have
been interpreted to include not only contractual, but other statutory and com-
mon law claims. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S.
20, 35 (1991) (holding that claims under the Age Discrimination in Employ-
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Arbitration provider institutions can also play a significant role
in the conduct and outcome of the arbitration process by de-
signing rules and procedures, setting fees, and determining
who may be on the list of potential arbitrators, in addition to
selecting the arbitrator in the event of default.18
ment Act are arbitrable); Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S.
220, 242 (1987) (holding that claims alleging violations of RICO and the 1934
Securities Exchange Act are arbitrable); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985) (finding that statutory
claims may be subject to arbitration if congruent with the parties' intent).
18. Provider institutions design rules and procedures for the process, set
fees, and determine the arbitrator to the extent that they provide a list of pro-
spective neutrals, as well as select the neutral in the event of default. See, e.g.,
AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, OVERVIEW, supra note 5; NAT'L ARBITRATION FORUM,
CODE OF PROCEDURE, (July 1, 2003), http://www.arb-forum.com/code/. These
institutions have been, and continue to be, influential in "shaping the arbitra-
tion landscape." See also Thomas J. Stipanowich, Behind the Neutral: A Look
at Provider Issues, 3 ADR CURRENTS 1 (Dec. 1998) [hereinafter Behind the
Neutral]; Thomas J. Stipanowich, Contract and Conflict Management, 2001
WIs. L. REV. 831, 878 [hereinafter Contract and Conflict Management] (noting
that the various activities of provider institutions in the arbitral process may
have a profound effect upon the parties' experience); JUDICIAL ARBITRATION &
MEDIATION SERVS., THE ARBITRATION EXPERTS, at http:ll
www.jamsadr.com/arb-practice.asp (last visited Oct. 12, 2002). Provider func-
tions include identifying and selecting interveners, establishing and maintain-
ing a pool of neutrals, and evaluating and ruling upon challenges to appoint-
ees. See Contract and Conflict Management, supra, at 878. For example, major
provider institutions have promulgated rules under which most arbitrations
are conducted. See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
RULES, (July 1, 2003), httpl/www.adr.org/index2.
ljsp?JSPssidl5747&JSPsrc=upload \L1VESITE \ Rules-Procedures \ National_
International\ .. .. \focusArea\ commercial \AAA235current.htm [hereinafter
AAA COMM. ARBITRATION RULES]; CPR INST. FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION,
RULES FOR NON-ADMINISTERED ARBITRATION, (Sept. 15, 2000) [hereinafter
CPR RULES], http://www.cpradr.org/arb-rules.htm. The AAA worked with the
American Bar Association (ABA) to develop a Code of Ethics for Arbitrators.
See AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N/AM. BAR ASS'N, CODE OF ETHICS FOR
ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES [hereinafter AAA/ABA, CODE OF
ETHICS], http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=15727&JSPsrc=upload\
LIVESITE\RulesProcedures\EthicsStandards\code.html (last visited Oct.
12, 2003). AAA President William K. Slate has taken positions on state legis-
lative proposals to regulate arbitration and also served on the commission that
developed the CPR-Georgetown Commission on Ethics and Standards of Prac-
tice in ADR. See William K. Slate II, The Justice-at-a-Price Guys Take Aim at
Arbitration, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2002, at B12; CPR-GEORGETOWN COMM'N ON
ETHICS AND STANDARDS OF PRACTICE IN ADR, PRINCIPLES FOR ADR PROVIDER
INSTITUTIONS (May 1, 2002), http://www.cpradr.org/finalProvider.pdf. Two
major arbitration providers filed amicus briefs in support of the employer in a
recent Supreme Court case. See Brief of Amici Curiae Am. Arbitration Ass'n,
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (No. 99-1379); Brief of
Nat'l Academy of Arbitrators, Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105
(2001) (No. 99-1379).
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Arbitration is used on a variety of scales, yet in many
ways, arbitration itself has become a profession, if not big busi-
ness. Although some arbitrators work for reduced or no com-
pensation in certain cases, the costs of a private arbitration
typically include the fees paid to the arbitrator (or panel of ar-
bitrators) on a flat fee or hourly (which can range from $75 to
well over $500 per hour) basis.' 9 Parties may also be responsi-
ble for paying a provider institution fee for a range of adminis-
trative support services, such as for filing claims, motions, or
responses, for case management, for the use of conference
rooms, or for participating in a hearing.20 According to a report
by Public Citizen, a nonprofit public interest research organiza-
tion, the administrative fees charged by provider institutions
can cost approximately 700% more than courts charge for simi-
21lar services.
19. The fees paid to the arbitrator are usually charged by the hour, and
vary according to the experience and background of the arbitrator. See
JUDICIAL ARBITRATION & MEDIATION SERVS., FEE INFORMATION (referring to
the arbitrator's fee as the "professional/hearing fee" and stating that this
"hourly rate varies depending upon the choice of judge, attorney-neutral or
mediator and the geographic location of the hearing"),
http://www.jamsadr.com/fee info.asp (last visited Oct. 12, 2003). Among the
services that may be included in this fee are "scheduled hearing time, extra
session time, conferences, reading time, research time, written agreements,
decisions, orders and award preparation time, conference calls, follow-up and
any additional services or work." Id.
20. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, BILLING GUIDELINES FOR NEUTRALS
(Apr. 17, 2003), http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=15773&JSPsrc=
upload/LIVESITE/Resources/Roster/Billing%20Guidelines.htm. The AAA's
Guidelines are based on the idea that, while an objective of ADR is to lower
costs, "both the AAA and arbitrators deserve to be fairly compensated for their
time and services." Id.; see also NAT'L ARBITRATION FORUM, SCHEDULE OF
FEES (including as costs the following: filing fees assessed when a claim is
filed, commencement fees assessed when the arbitration begins, administra-
tive fees assessed when a response is filed, document hearing fees, and par-
ticipator hearing fees), http://www.arbitration-forum.com/code/appx-c.asp (last
visited Oct. 13, 2003). For example, the NAF's fee schedule includes filing fees
ranging from $25 to $240 and other administrative fees ranging from $25 up
to $1000. See id. The fee schedules are based on the amount of the claim. Id.
Additionally, there are fees for findings of fact and conclusions, which range
from $100 to $750, and the fee schedules also state that the responsible par-
ties will pay each arbitrator a fee that is determined by the Forum Director.
Id.
21. PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 16 (discussing the results of a survey of
costs related to arbitration). The report summary notes that case administra-
tion costs by a county court clerk average $44.20, while the AAA's average
administrative cost per case is $340.63. Id. As another example of the dispa-
rate costs, the report notes that the NAF charges $75 to issue a subpoena,
whereas a litigant can obtain a subpoena for free simply by downloading a
454
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Federal legislation, specifically the Federal Arbitration Act
of 1925 (FAA), 2 provides for the judicial enforcement of written
contracts to resolve disputes by arbitration. 3 Although initially
reluctant to interpret the FAA expansively, 2 the United States
Supreme Court now regularly relies on the statute as the basis
to preempt state laws regulating arbitration and to uphold the
enforcement of mandatory predispute arbitration agreements
in a variety of contexts, including resolution of statutory and
common law claims in employment and consumer transac-• 25
tions. According to the Court, the FAA evinces a "federal pol-
icy favoring arbitration.26
The FAA's statutory framework primarily addresses proce-
dural matters providing for the judicial enforcement of arbitra-
tion agreements and awards, but also identifies specific
grounds for vacating such awards. 7 However, the FAA does not
address increasingly important issues in contemporary arbitra-
tion. For example, the FAA is silent on whether, if at all, par-
ties are entitled to minimum standards of due process in man-
datory consumer and employment arbitration; what standards
of ethics, disclosure, or conduct apply to arbitrators and pro-
vider institutions; or whether arbitrators or provider institu-
tions are or should be accorded immunity from civil actions to
the same extent as public judges.8 State arbitration legislation
form on the Internet. Id.
22. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000).
23. Id. § 2 ("A written provision in any ... contract evidencing a transac-
tion involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter aris-
ing out of such contract or transaction ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and en-
forceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.").
24. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953) (holding that the Se-
curities Act of 1933 prohibited a waiver of a judicial remedy by a predispute
arbitration agreement because the underlying purpose of the Act was to pro-
tect investors), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, 490
U.S. 477, 481 (1989) (relying on the federal policy of favoring arbitration to re-
verse Wilko and finding securities claims arbitrable).
25. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001)
(holding that statutory claims are also subject to a pre-employment arbitration
agreement contained in an employment application); Green Tree Fin. Corp.-
Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000) (requiring arbitration of consumer
protection statutory claims).
26. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26
(1991) (citing federal policy favoring arbitration in ruling that federal age dis-
crimination claims are arbitrable).
27. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 9 (providing for judicial confirmation of arbitration
awards); id. § 10 (specifying grounds for vacatur of an arbitration award).
28. See REVISED UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT, Prefatory Note (2000) [here-
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typically mirrors the FAA's structure, leaving these questions
unanswered or addressed by ad hoc judicial decisions, preca-
tory standards set by the arbitration community, or by contract
between the private arbitral institutions or the individual arbi-
ter and the parties."
Prominent national ADR professionals and provider insti-
tutions have been at the forefront in promulgating aspirational
rules and standards for the professional ethics, disclosure, and
conduct of private arbitrators ° and provider institutions.3'
Some provider institutions maintain internal policies and stan-
dards in an attempt to ensure a fair arbitration process for
their users.32 At least one state, California, has enacted specific
inafter RUAA], http://www.law.upenn.edulbll/ulc/uarba/arbitratl213.pdf.
29. See Huber & Trachte-Huber, supra note 3, at 32 (noting that the sub-
stantive provisions of the Uniform Arbitration Act, enacted in thirty-five
states, largely track the FAA and that nearly all of the other states have
adopted a similar statute).
30. See, e.g., AAAIABA, CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 18; CPR-
GEORGETOWN COMM'N ON ETHICS AND STANDARDS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
PRACTICE, ADR ETHICS PROJECT (noting the need to consider the ethical du-
ties and obligations of institutions providing and seeking ADR services),
http://www.cpradr.orglethics.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2003).
31. See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, A GUIDE FOR COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATORS: RULES AND PROCEDURES, http://www.adr.org/
index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=15727&JSPsrc=upload \ LIVESITE \RulesProcedures \
ADRGuides\comguide.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2003); CPR-GEORGETOWN
COMM'N ON ETHICS AND STANDARDS OF PRACTICE IN ADR, PRINCIPLES FOR
ADR PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS (May 1, 2002),
http://www.cpradr.orglFinalProvider.pdf; MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 4.5 (CPR-Georgetown Comm'n on Ethics and Standards in ADR, Draft for
Comment, 1999), httpJ/www.cpradr.org/cpr-george.html.
32. See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, CONSUMER DUE PROCESS
PROTOCOL (May 1998), http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?
JSPssid=15769&JSPsrc=upload\ LIVESITE \RulesProcedures \ Protocols \.. \..
\ Resources \ EduResources \ consumerprotocol.html; AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N,
A DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL FOR MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY
DISPUTES ARISING OUT OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP (May 9, 1995),
http://www.adr.org/index2. 1.jsp?JSPssid=15717&JSPsrc=upload \ LIVESITE \
focusArea\employment\protocol.html; JUDICIAL ARBITRATION & MEDIATION
SERVS., ETHICS GUIDELINES FOR ARBITRATORS (2002),
http://www.jamsadr.con/ethics for-arbs.asp; JUDICIAL ARBITRATION &
MEDIATION SERVS., JAMS POLICY ON EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION MINIMUM
STANDARDS OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS (2003), http:/!
www.jamsadr.com/images/PDF/EmploymentArbitrationMinStd-2003.PDF.
See AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, OVERVIEW, supra note 5 (noting that AAA neu-
trals are guided by the Code of Ethics); AM. ARBITRATION AS'N, CODE OF
ETHICS FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATORS, http://www.adr.
org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=16235&JSPsrc=upload\livesite \RulesProcedures\
EthicsStandards/code.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2003); AM. ARBITRATION
ASS'N, STATEMENT OF ETHICAL PRINCIPLES FOR THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION
456
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conduct and disclosure standards for arbitrators, but does not
provide an independent mechanism for enforcement or over-
sight. 33 Due to the unregulated nature of the arbitration prac-
tice, however, enforcement of these rules is difficult, if not im-
possible, leaving compliance largely voluntary.34 Moreover, even
though many providers set forth standards and rules for an ar-
bitration under their auspices, these rules or contractual
agreements typically contain provisions exculpating them from
"any and all" liability, including liability for failing to follow the
provider's own rules, policies, and contractual obligations.35
Some providers even condition their services upon the parties'
agreement to waive compliance with internal rules or applica-
ble laws.36 Irrespective of the efforts for, or legality of, contrac-
tual immunity for arbitrators and providers,37 the law in vari-
ASSOCIATION, AN ADR PROVIDER ORGANIZATION [hereinafter STATEMENT OF
ETHICAL PRINCIPLES], http://www.adr.org/index2. 1.jsp?JSPssid=15718&
JSPsrc=upload \LIVESITE \RulesProcedures/EthicsStandards \ principals.ht
ml (last visited Nov. 10, 2003).
33. CAL. R. OF COURT, app. VI Standards 1-17 (2003) [hereinafter Cali-
fornia Arbitrator Ethics Standards], http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov
rules/appendix/appdiv6.pdf; see id. Standard 1(d) ("These standards are not
intended either to affect any existing cause of action or to create any new
cause of action."). Violation of the standards can cause disqualification of the
arbitrator. Id. Standard 10. These standards have been challenged under FAA
preemption grounds. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
34. See Stipanowich, Behind the Neutral, supra note 18, at 14 ("All pro-
viders, whether for-profit or non-profit, facilitate or implement ADR in one or
more forms and, for good or ill, they all compete in the marketplace without
significant outside regulation.").
35. See, e.g., AAA, COMM. ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 18, R. 8(d)
("[Neither the AAA nor any arbitrator shall be liable to any party.., for any
act or omission in connection with any arbitration under these rules."); CPR
RULES, supra note 18, R. 19 ("Neither CPR nor any arbitrator shall be liable to
any party for any act or omission in connection with any arbitration conducted
under these Rules"); JUDICIAL ARBITRATION & MEDIATION SERVS.,
EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES AND PROCEDURES, R. 28(c) (2003) [herein-
after JAMS, RULES AND PROCEDURES] (disqualifying the arbitrator as a wit-
ness or a party and precluding arbitrator liability), http://www.jamsadr.com/
images/PDR/EmploymentArbitrationRules-2003.PDF.
36. The New York Stock Exchange, Inc., and the National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD) sought an exemption from the state arbitrator eth-
ics standards. See Margaret Graham Tebo, Stock Answer to Ethics Spat: Wall
Street Bypasses California's Securities Arbitration Rules, 89 A.B.A. J., Mar.
2003, at 14, 14. In California, these entities administer securities arbitrations
on the condition that the parties consent to a waiver of the provider's compli-
ance with the California Arbitrator Ethics Standards. Id.
37. The validity of these contractual disclaimers has not been widely liti-
gated. As a matter of general tort law, one may not contract away his own neg-
ligence or intentional torts. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
457
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ous guises confers substantial protection from civil liability
through the doctrine of arbitral immunity. As a result, parties
injured by arbitral misconduct have limited recourse and effec-
tively no remedy.
While codes for arbitrator and provider ethics provide im-
portant guidelines, their impact is questionable if true en-
forcement is unavailable. Ensuring the enforcement of stan-
dards and providing meaningful remedies to those injured by
arbitral misconduct is equally as important as articulating
standards of conduct and professional ethics for arbitrators and
provider institutions. The availability of judicial recourse, a key
step towards this objective, is restricted not only by the FAA's
limited vacatur remedy 8 but also by broad arbitral immunity
doctrines recognized by state statute or common law." The Re-
vised Uniform Arbitration Act (RUAA), promulgated by the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL), proposes not only to codify this immunity for arbi-
trators and provider institutions but also to penalize audacious
challenges.40
Despite a seemingly entrenched rule of arbitral immunity,
numerous individuals have alleged a range of claims against
arbitrators and provider institutions, including breach of con-
tract, failure to follow internal policies, failing to disclose con-
flicts of interest, negligence, bias, deceptive advertising, con-
(2002); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 (West 2000) ("All contracts which have for their
object, directly or indirectly, to exempt anyone from responsibility for his own
fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another, or violation of law,
whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of the law.").
38. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000).
39. See infra Part II.C.
40. See RUAA § 14(a) (2000) ("An arbitrator or an arbitration organization
acting in that capacity is immune from civil liability.....),
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/uarba/arbitratl213.pdf; see also id. § 14(e)
("If a person commences a civil action against an arbitrator, arbitration or-
ganization, or representative of an arbitration organization... the court shall
award to the arbitrator, organization, or representative reasonable attorney's
fees and other reasonable expenses of litigation."). According to commentary
accompanying this provision, "[by definition, almost all suits against arbitra-
tors, arbitration organizations, or representatives of an arbitration organiza-
tion arising out of the good-faith discharge of arbitral powers are frivolous be-
cause of the breadth of their respective immunity." Id. at cmt. 6. The
preemptive force of the FAA limits states' ability to enact protective legislation
that conflicts with the FAA or that imposes higher standards on arbitration
than other contracts. See, e.g., Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Cassarotto, 517 U.S.
681, 687 (1996). However, the FAA is silent on the issue of arbitrator immu-
nity and thus, state legislatures or the courts may act. RUAA, supra note 28,
at Prefatory Note.
[Vol 88:449
20041 REEXAMINING ARBITRAL IMMUNITY 459
spiracy, and antitrust violations.4' In all of these cases, plain-
tiffs lost due to the seemingly impenetrable doctrine of arbitral
immunity.4' The changing nature of the arbitration industry
and the fact that so many individuals have been discouraged
from asserting arbitral misconduct claims, combined with the
RUAA's proposal to effectively bar and penalize mere chal-
lenges, necessitates an examination of the continued propriety
of the doctrine.43
The use of arbitration has changed significantly since the
FAA's inception in 1925, from the traditional model involving
voluntary arbitration between parties of relatively equal bar-
gaining power, to a system where arbitration has become a pro-
fession and a commercialized industry that is imposed upon
consumers and employees. Meanwhile, a significant body of
federal and state laws has since developed to protect civil
rights, market competition, employees, and consumers.4 Pre-
sumably, the policy of enforcing agreements to arbitrate does
not supplant laws requiring individuals engaging in contracts,
albeit contracts to provide arbitral services, to comply with
their promises and to be held accountable for their conduct. In-
dividuals of nearly every profession are held accountable for
41. See infra Part II.C.
42. See infra Part II.C.
43. I do not purport to offer statistical evidence concerning the degree to
which arbitral misconduct, broadly defined, is a problem. A review of such
complaints does indicate that the problem is at least an issue in some cases. In
addition, public attention and concern over the problematic aspects of private
mandatory consumer arbitration has been piqued by media reports and indi-
vidual accounts of seemingly appalling arbitration experiences. A series of ar-
ticles in the San Francisco Chronicle presented an apparently disturbing pic-
ture of private arbitration. Reynolds Holding, Can Public Count on Fair
Arbitration?, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 8, 2001, at A15; Reynolds Holding, Judges'Ac-
tions Cast Shadow on Court Integrity, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 9, 2001, at A13 (re-
porting claims of financial ties between provider institutions); Reynolds Hold-
ing, Millions Are Losing Their Legal Rights, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 7, 2001, at Al;
see also Hundley-Paul v. Allred, Maroko & Goldberg, No. B144980, slip op. at
2-6 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Sept. 27, 2001) (upholding an arbitration of an
attorney malpractice claim where the mandatory arbitration lasted forty-nine
months); PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 16 (describing several cases of individu-
als aggrieved by the arbitration process); Moore v. JAMS, Inc., P1's First Am.
Compl., No. BC249553 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2002) (alleging contractual breaches by
a consumer against a for-profit arbitration provider).
44. Arbitral agreements cannot preclude causes of action or remedies pro-
vided for by statute. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985) ("By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a
party does not forego the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only
submits their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.").
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complying with their contractual obligations and for exercising
a reasonable degree of competency. Does it continue to make
sense to exempt from the law the entire arbitration industry?
This Article examines the assumption that arbitrators and
provider institutions should be per se immune from civil liabil-
ity. Further, this Article considers options for meaningful re-
dress where an arbitrator or provider institution has breached
its own policies or contractual obligations; negligently per-
formed professional services; engaged in fraud, misconduct, or
corruption; exceeded his or her powers; violated ethical codes
requiring impartiality and disclosure of conflicts of interest; or
otherwise engaged in conduct subject to civil liability (arbitral
failures).45 Part I sets forth the general legal framework for ar-
bitration and identifies the limited statutory means for vacat-
ing an arbitration award and obtaining recourse against arbi-
tral failures. Part II traces the development and theoretical
foundation of the immunity doctrine, as established to insulate
public judges and certain other public officials who act in a
comparable adjudicatory capacity. Part II also follows the doc-
trine's growth to cover a range of acts by private arbitrators
and private arbitration institutions. Part III argues against the
broad and uncritical expansion of arbitral immunity. This Part
recognizes that a broad doctrine of arbitral immunity deviates
from established parameters of the judicial immunity doctrine,
particularly with respect to immunizing provider institutions
from answering independent claims of contractual breaches,
tortious conduct, or statutory violations. Significant differences
exist between public judges operating in an open judicial proc-
ess and the private judging world of arbitration, which necessi-
tates a more exacting scope of immunity. Part IV submits that
a standard of qualified immunity appropriately balances the
competing policy concerns of protecting arbitrators in their de-
cisional roles, while also holding the arbitration industry ac-
countable to parties and the public. This Article also proposes a
system for public oversight of arbitration to better ensure proc-
ess fairness to participants, meaningful enforcement of arbitral
codes of conduct, and accountability of the arbitration industry.
45. For example, although the FAA provides for vacatur, is it also appro-
priate to insulate independent acts of arbitral misconduct by absolute immu-
nity? Should contractual immunity provisions, liability disclaimers, and pen-
alty challenge provisions be upheld notwithstanding a limited application of
arbitral immunity?
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I. ARBITRATION LEGISLATION AND LIMITED
RECOURSE FOR ARBITRAL FAILURES
A. THE FAA AND THE "FEDERAL POLICY FAVORING
ARBITRATION"
1. Key Provisions and Intent
The Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 provides for the en-
forcement of written agreements to resolve disputes by private• • 46
arbitration. The FAA's purpose is to provide for the judicial
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate on the same basis as
other contracts, 47 and it is considered the basis for a national
policy in favor of arbitration. Based on the FAA and substan-
tial Supreme Court precedent articulating the FAA's wide ap-
plication and strong federal policy preference for arbitration,
parties to an arbitration agreement can be bound to arbitrate a
wide variety of disputes-including federal and state statutory
claims as well as contractual and common law claims-unless
specifically excluded in the agreement or indicated by Congress
in specific legislation.4 9 The Supreme Court has also ruled that
the FAA preempts state laws that negate arbitration by man-
dating a judicial forum for particular disputes." Finding that
the FAA is a "substantive rule applicable in state as well as
46. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
47. H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924) (discussing congressional intent to
place an arbitration agreement "upon the same footing as other contracts,
where it belongs"); see also Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford
Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989) (comparing freedom of contract with
the right to arbitration); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984)
("Congress has thus mandated the enforcement of arbitration agreements.").
48. See Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 12.
49. For example, courts have upheld compulsory arbitration when re-
quired by an employer for statutory civil rights claims of its employees as a
condition of employment, provided the agreements comply with traditional
principles of contract law. Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 937
(4th Cir. 1999) (finding predispute agreements to arbitrate Title VII claims
valid); see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 614, 628
(1991); EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 303 F.3d 994, 104 (9th
Cir. 2002), vacated by 319 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2003).
50. See Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 10 (stating that "[i]n enacting § 2 of
the federal Act, Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and
withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution
of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration");
Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25
(1983) (stating "any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be
resolved in favor of arbitration").
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federal courts," the Court has struck down state law that "at-
tempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agree-
ments" as a violation of the Supremacy Clause.5'
2. The Basis for Broad Enforcement of Arbitration Contracts
Courts enforce predispute mandatory arbitration clauses
based on contractual principles that parties waived their rights
to a judicial forum by consenting to arbitration.2 Standard con-
tract defenses can apply to void an arbitration agreement, in-
cluding duress, unconscionability, fraud, undue influence, lack
of capacity, lack of mutuality, and waiver. 53 For example, some
courts have held arbitration clauses unenforceable where the
proposed arbitration procedure was deemed unconscionable for
want of adequate procedural protections or for failure to ensure
54
a nonbiased process.
51. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 16; see also Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Cas-
sarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (holding that the FAA preempts a state stat-
ute mandating that arbitration agreements comply with a special notice re-
quirement); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270-73
(1995) (preempting an Alabama statute that barred predispute arbitration
agreements). Two courts have held that California's recently enacted ethical
and conduct standards for arbitrators are preempted by the FAA and federal
securities legislation. See Wilmot v. McNabb, 269 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1207-12
(N.D. Cal. 2003) (concluding that application of the California standards to
self-regulatory organizations is preempted by the Exchange Act, the compre-
hensive system of federal regulation of the securities industry established pur-
suant to the Exchange Act, and by Section 2 of the FAA); Mayo v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1111-12 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (concluding
that application of the California standards to self-regulatory organizations is
preempted by the Exchange Act, the comprehensive system of federal regula-
tion of the securities industry established pursuant to the Exchange Act, and
by Section 2 of the FAA).
52. See Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer
Law (with a Contractualist Reply to Carrington and Haagen), 29 MCGEORGE
L. REV. 195, 220 (1998) (stating that the Supreme Court has ruled that the
decision to arbitrate does not violate substantive rights, but instead acts as a
forum choice).
53. See Allied Bruce-Terminix Cos., 513 U.S. at 281 (noting that states
can regulate arbitration clauses under general principles of contract law). To
avoid arbitration under a fraud defense, however, it is insufficient that a party
was defrauded into making the entire contract which included an arbitration
clause; under the "separability" doctrine, the parties must demonstrate that
fraud occurred in the formation of the arbitration clause itself. See Prima
Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967).
54. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 896 (9th
Cir. 2002) (ruling an arbitration clause was unenforceable due to its unilateral
nature and limits on damages award); Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173
F.3d 933, 935 (4th Cir. 1999) (declining to compel arbitration where an em-
ployer had "set up a dispute resolution process utterly lacking in the rudi-
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A party cannot avoid the arbitration obligation, however,
merely based on a generalized grievance that the arbitration
process is skewed in favor of the repeat player or party with in-
ordinate bargaining power, 5 or that the fees may be prohibi-
tively expensive." Despite these concerns, a party must submit
to the process. Thereafter, vacatur is the only remedy available
to the party who can prove, in a separate judicial action, actual
arbitral bias, fraud, misconduct, or an inability to vindicate
rights. Upon vacatur, the party may return to arbitration.57
3. The FAA's Limited Recourse for Arbitral Failures,
Token Remedy, and the Arbitral Immunity Backdrop
This broad legislative and judicial support, coupled with
the perceived business advantages, has caused the use of arbi-
tration to increase dramatically, most notably in predispute
mandatory arbitration clauses in consumer transactions and as
conditions of employment. Procedurally, arbitration is gener-
ments of even-handedness"); Penn v. Ryan's Family Steakhouses, Inc., 95 F.
Supp. 2d 940, 946 (N.D. Ind. 2000) (finding that provisions for selecting an ar-
bitration panel were inherently unfair when the employer and the provider
were in collaboration for repeat and exclusive dispute resolution services).
55. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991).
56. See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92 (2000)
(requiring an actual showing that prohibitive costs render an individual un-
able to vindicate her rights in arbitration).
57. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000) (providing grounds for vacating an arbitral
award); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1287 (2003) (authorizing a court to order a
rehearing before the same panel of arbitrators, even though the panel was
found to have exceeded its powers, but only before a new panel if the decision
was vacated due to arbitrator corruption, misconduct, or fraud).
58. See KATHERINE V.W. STONE, PRIVATE JUSTICE: THE LAW OF
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 4-5 (Foundation Press ed., 2000) (provid-
ing statistical evidence of the growing use of arbitration and other forms of
ADR); Julia A. Scarpino, Comment, Mandatory Arbitration of Consumer Dis-
putes: A Proposal to Ease the Financial Burden on Low-Income Consumers, 10
AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POLY & L. 679, 688 (2002) (noting the increase in both
the use of arbitration for consumer disputes and in costs). Many companies
have inserted mandatory arbitration clauses in consumer contracts as a way
to avoid adverse publicity, class actions, punitive damages, and large verdicts.
See Jean S. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Ac-
tion, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 55-56 (2000)
(noting that "[iinspired by the Supreme Court's heightened enthusiasm for ar-
bitration in case after case, most federal and state courts have found arbitra-
tion may be compelled based on clauses contained in. . . form contracts"); Har-
rington, supra note 13, at 102-03 (describing various credit card companies'
use of mandatory arbitration clauses). But cf Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126,
1149-52 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a mandatory arbitration clause with the
main purpose of shielding the company from liability was unconscionable and
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ally a confidential process that contains no guarantees of due
process, discovery, appeal, or other protections that are avail-
able in the judicial system.59 By design, parties submitting to
arbitration have minimal judicial recourse. The use of manda-
tory arbitration in these situations can be problematic, how-
ever, because once a party is in arbitration, the law provides
them little remedy, regardless of improprieties in the process or
arbitral misconduct.
The FAA sets forth limited grounds for the judicial review
of arbitration awards, permitting a court to vacate an arbitra-
tion award:
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means.
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitra-
tors, or either of them.
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to
hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any
other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been preju-
diced.
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the sub-
unenforceable).
59. Arbitration is rarely given the same statutory confidentiality protec-
tions as mediation. As a matter of agreement, however, arbitration is private,
not public. See CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION:
CASES AND PROBLEMS 417 (LexisNexis ed., 2002) (noting that most arbitration
statutes are silent on confidentiality but that provider arbitration rules or ar-
bitration contracts may impose confidentiality obligations); Alexis C. Brown,
Presumption Meets Reality: An Exploration of the Confidentiality Obligation in
International Commercial Arbitration, 16 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 969, 973 (2001)
(noting confidentiality and privacy as "among the hallmarks of arbitration"
(citation omitted)); Stipanowich, Contract and Conflict Management, supra
note 18, at 882 (noting the exclusion of outside parties from the hearing room,
the lack of an official record of arbitration proceedings, and the tradition of
publishing an award without an accompanying rationale); AM. ARBITRATION
ASS'N, CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL, supra note 32; JAMS, RULES AND
PROCEDURES, supra note 35, at 6 (describing the exchange of information in
arbitration proceedings); id. at 11 (outlining the "Optional Arbitration Appeal
Procedure"). In addressing confidentiality in arbitration, the AAA notes that
"[c]onsistent with general expectations of privacy in arbitration hearings, the
arbitrator should make reasonable efforts to maintain the privacy of the hear-
ing to the extent permitted by applicable law. The arbitrator should also care-
fully consider claims of privilege and confidentiality when addressing eviden-
tiary issues." AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL,
supra note 32, Principle 12(2); see also AAA/ABA, CODE OF ETHICS, supra note
18, at Canon VI (B) ("Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, or required by
applicable rules of law, an arbitrator should keep confidential all matters re-
lating to the arbitration proceedings and decision.").
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ject matter submitted was not made.6
The threshold for establishing these grounds for vacatur is
stringent.61 Courts appear extremely reluctant to inquire into
the propriety of arbitrator conduct or the arbitral process and
accordingly impose a high standard of willfulness to even va-
cate an arbitration award.62
Redress under the FAA for arbitral misconduct, bias, or
fraud-that the award is "set aside," returning the parties to
the same system for round two-is itself unsatisfactory, a to-
ken.63 Vacatur is a small consolation when a party injured by
arbitrator fraud or misconduct is out attorney fees, arbitration
fees, costs, and time for the underlying arbitration and the ju-
dicial appeal to overturn the award. This consolation prize is
even smaller considering that the party must return to the
same unjust forum, with the same lack of procedural safe-
guards, for a repeated attempt to resolve the underlying
60. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (a)(1)-(4). In addition, a party may petition a federal
court to modify or correct an award "[w]here there was an evident material
miscalculation of figures or an evident material mistake in the description of
any person, thing, or property referred to in the award... [wihere the arbitra-
tors have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them," or "[w]here the
award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the contro-
versy." Id. § 11(a)-(c).
61. See, e.g., In re Andros Compania Maritima, S.A., 579 F.2d 691, 701 (2d
Cir. 1987) (affirming an arbitration award although the arbitrator failed to
disclose that he had recently sat on nineteen arbitration panels with the
president of a party, who had also selected the arbitrator in twelve panels);
Card v. Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 933 F. Supp. 806, 815 (D. Minn. 1996) (hold-
ing that the violation of the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure did not re-
quire nullification of the arbitration award); cf Rogers v. Schering Corp., 165
F. Supp. 295, 302-03 (D.N.J. 1958) (finding that the failure of the AAA to fol-
low its own rules disclosing circumstances likely to create a presumption of
bias required a section ten vacation of a royalties payment award).
62. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practice Litig., 47 Fed.
Appx. 78, 79 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that the effect of the FAA has been that
"judicial review of an arbitration award is very deferential," and "only where
there is a manifest disregard of the agreement, totally unsupported by princi-
ples of contract construction and the law of the shop may a reviewing court
disturb the award" (citation omitted)).
63. Maureen A. Weston, Checks on Participant Conduct in Compulsory
ADR: Reconciling the Tension in the Need for Good-Faith Participation,
Autonomy, and Confidentiality, 76 IND. L.J. 591, 607 (2001); Mark A. Spon-
seller, Note, Redefining Arbitral Immunity: A Proposed Qualified Immunity
Statute for Arbitrators, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 421, 424 (1993) (claiming that vaca-
tur fails to "compensate the aggrieved party for [its] lost time, wasted attor-
ney's fees, payments to arbitrators, and other incidental and consequential
damages" and "is at best [an] incomplete remedy").
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claims.64 Obviously, simply setting aside the outcome does not
compensate the aggrieved party for the costs, fees, time, conse-
quential damages, and anguish incurred in enduring an arbi-
tration proceeding tainted with bad faith or misconduct.65
The policy favoring arbitration rests upon the belief that
contracts to settle disputes by arbitration should be "upon the
same footing" as other contracts and thus respected and en-
forced.66 Nevertheless, parties to an arbitration also generally
contract with the arbitrator and the provider institution to pro-
vide arbitration services, implicitly if not expressly, in accor-
dance with the contractual terms and the representations
about the quality of services.7 What recourse is or should be
available when a party is injured by an arbitral failure? Does
the reverence for contract apply equally to the enforcement of
contractual obligations by arbitration providers?
B. STATE REGULATION OF PROFESSIONS-Is ARBITRATION ON
THE HORIZON?
1. Professions Regulated to Protect the Public Interest
Pursuant to its police power and in the interest of public
protection, states regulate virtually all professions-from doc-
tors, lawyers, accountants, dentists, and real estate agents, to
plumbers and cosmetologists.6 8 For example, attorneys are sub-
64. Weston, supra note 63, at 608. Similar costs may be incurred in public
adjudication where a case is remanded or reversed due to judicial error, but
the process is governed by due process standards and procedural rules.
65. Id.
66. See H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924).
67. Arbitration providers widely advertise their services, members, and
expertise in legal newspapers, glossy brochures, and on Web sites. These ad-
vertisements indicate an impressive display of neutral services, high commit-
ments to procedural fairness, neutrality, various due process protocols, and
adherence to codes of ethics. See generally AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N (listing in-
formation about AAA rules and procedures), at http://www.adr.org (last visited
Oct. 12, 2003); JUDICIAL ARBITRATION & MEDIATION SERVS. (describing their
"expert" arbitration services), at http://www.jamsadr.com (last visited Oct. 12,
2003). Announcing adherence to ethical standards is attractive marketing, but
lack of compliance or enforcement calls this into question. For example, al-
though the AAA had publicly adopted its commitment to the Health Care Due
Process Protocol in 1996, it did not require its arbitrators to comply with the
policy until brought under public scrutiny in 2002. See Reynolds Holding, Ar-
bitration Reform in Works, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 11, 2002, at Al.
68. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE, §§ 5000-9999 (2003) (containing
regulations for over twenty-one categories of licensed professions). The pur-
pose of the California State Department of Consumer Affairs is to
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ject to an elaborate set of rules of professional conduct enforced
by the state bar. The rationale in regulating lawyers is that it
is necessary to maintain continued public confidence in the ju-
dicial system and to protect the public.69 Professions requiring
special training or specific skills are within the scope of occupa-
tions affected with the public interest.0
Professionals and companies operating within professional
industries are held to a standard of care for their respective
[e]nsur[e] that those private businesses and professions deemed to
engage in activities which have potential impact upon the public
health, safety, and welfare are adequately regulated in order to pro-
tect the people of California.
To this end, they establish minimum qualifications and levels of
competency and license persons desiring to engage in the occupations
they regulate upon determining that such persons possess the requi-
site skills and qualifications necessary to provide safe and effective
services to the public, or register or otherwise certify persons in order
to identify practitioners and ensure performance according to set and
accepted professional standards. They provide a means for redress of
grievances by investigating allegations of unprofessional conduct, in-
competence, fraudulent action, or unlawful activity brought to their
attention by members of the public and institute disciplinary action
against persons licensed or registered under the provisions of this
code when such action is warranted. In addition, they conduct peri-
odic checks of licensees, registrants, or otherwise certified persons in
order to ensure compliance with the relevant sections of this code.
Id. § 101.6.
69. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, Preamble at 6 (1983); see also
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 361 (1977) ("[Tlhe regulation of the
activities of the bar is at the core of the State's power to protect the public.").
In Lebbos v. State Bar of California, the court noted that
Attorneys and counselors at law have long been known as "officers of
the court," and as such they have for centuries been required to un-
dergo certain courses of preparation and to assume certain solemn ob-
ligations relative to their training, character and conduct as such; and
these not only with respect to their relation to the courts, but also
with regard to their relation to the public at large. Thus it is that the
profession and practice of the law, while in a limited sense a matter of
private choice and concern in so far as it relates to its emoluments, is
essentially and more largely a matter of public interest and concern,
not only from the viewpoint of its relation to administration of civil
and criminal law, but also from that of the contacts of its membership
with the constituent membership of society at large, whose interest it
is to be safeguarded against the ignorances or evil dispositions of
those who may be masquerading beneath the cloak of the legal and
supposedly learned and upright profession.... It is for each and all of
these reasons that the membership, character and conduct of those
entering and engaging in the legal profession have long been regarded
as the proper subject of legislative regulation and control ....
806 P.2d 317, 323-24 (Cal. 1991) (citation omitted).
70. See Semler v. Or. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 294 U.S. 608, 610
(1935).
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profession and are accountable for their acts and omissions.7
Many of these professions, including public judges, are subject
to codes of conduct and public oversight. While a professional
ethics or code of conduct violation does not per se indicate mal-
practice or a breach of the duty of care, such violations are a
factor in measuring professional negligence. 72 Significantly,
public policy considerations and codes of professional conduct
generally preclude members of these professions from attempt-
ing to limit their liability for their professional negligence.73
2. Arbitration's Lack of Regulation
Unlike other professionals or businesses, arbitrators and
provider institutions are not subject to specific regulatory stan-
dards or public oversight. Voluntary and aspirational codes for
arbitral conduct have been in effect for years, however.74 Other
71. See Richard A. Glaser & Leslee M. Lewis, Redefining the Professional:
The Policies and Unregulated Development of Consultant Malpractice Liabil-
ity, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 563, 576 (1995) (noting that malpractice now
extends beyond the four "learned professions"-law, medicine, ministry, and
teaching-to "dentists, pharmacists, veterinarians, architects and engineers,
accountants, abstractors of title, among others" who undertake the "educa-
tional, organizational, ethical and licensing characteristics of the professions");
see also John W. Wade, An Overview of Professional Negligence, 17 MEM. ST.
U. L. REV. 465, 477-78 (1987) (discussing other professions that have applied
professional standards similar to those of law and medicine).
72. See Glaser & Lewis, supra note 71, at 575. A profession may be distin-
guished by
[1] the requirements of extensive formal training and learning, [2]
admission to practice by qualifying licensure, [31 code of ethics impos-
ing standards qualitatively and extensively beyond those that prevail
or are tolerated in the marketplace, [4] a system for discipline of its
members for a violation of the code of ethics, [5] duties to subordinate
financial reward to social responsibility, and, notably, an obligation
on its members, even in non-professional manners, to conduct them-
selves as members of a learned, disciplined and honorable occupation.
Id. (citation omitted).
73. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 (2003) ("All contracts which have for
their object, directly or indirectly, to exempt anyone from responsibility for his
own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another, or violation of
law, whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of the law."); MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(h)(1) (1983) (stating that a lawyer shall not
"make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for
malpractice unless the client is independently represented in making this
agreement").
74. See, e.g., AAA/ABA, CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 18 (setting forth six
canons that arbitrators should follow, to "uphold the integrity and fairness of
the arbitration process," "disclose any interest or relationship likely to affect
impartiality or which might create an appearance of partiality or bias," "avoid
impropriety or the appearance of impropriety," "conduct the proceedings fairly
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codes and protocols have also been developed to ensure fairness
in the arbitration process.75 Although many arbitrators and
provider institutions ascribe to such ethical precepts, compli-
ance is voluntary and subject only to private self-enforcement. 6
As one commentator has observed, arbitration associations
"have an economic disincentive to enforcing their codes of eth-
ics. There is an inherent conflict of interest for arbitration asso-
ciations: they must enforce codes of ethics enough to preserve
the good name of arbitration, but not so much that they gener-
ate unwanted publicity and lawsuits."77
The potential for abuse in such an unregulated environ-
ment is illustrated by the case of Southern California Arbitra-
tion Association (SCAA), a particularly disconcerting report of a
pop-up arbitration provider business arrangement.1 The SCAA
was essentially a shell company run by an associate of a real
estate developer. 79 The developer's contracts with purchasers
provided for mandatory arbitration of all disputes exclusively
before the SCAA, named a specific arbitrator (also closely asso-
ciated with the developer), and required waiver of any conflicts
of interest. The arbitrator, whose previous experience was lim-
ited to one case, awarded the developer $558,270.80 Landlords
who dealt with the developer filed a lawsuit, describing the de-
fendant's control over the arbitration service as a means to ex-
tract money from adversaries." The SCAA situation appears an
and diligently," "make decisions in a just, independent and deliberate man-
ner," and "be faithful to the relationship of trust and confidentiality inherent
in that office"); JUDICIAL ARBITRATION & MEDIATION SERVS., ETHICS
GUIDELINES FOR ARBITRATORS, supra note 32 ("[The purpose of these Ethics
Guidelines is to provide basic guidance to JAMS Arbitrators regarding ethical
issues.").
75. See supra notes 17, 31 (citing various ethical standards and due proc-
ess protocols for the arbitration of health care, employment, and consumer dis-
putes).
76. See Sabin, supra note 8, at 1355 (explaining that ethics codes are inef-
fective because some associations admittedly fail to enforce codes of ethics, any
enforcement powers extend only to members, and as the associations provide
"no public listing of sanctioned or expelled arbitrators, other associations and
the public have no means to identify and avoid unethical arbitrators ... [or
any] way to insure consistent enforcement").
77. Id. at 1355-56.
78. Myron Levin, Caveat: Know Your Arbitrator, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 19,
1997, at D1.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Myron Levin, L.A. Landlords Sue Arbitration Group, Accuse It of
Fraud, L.A. TIMES, June 6, 1997, at D1; see also Myron Levin, Judge Hits De-
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appalling and rare case. However, the opportunities for such
exclusive provider relationships are real and legitimate issues
of public concern.82
3. The California Experiment
In 2003, California became the first state to enact legisla-
tion regulating provider institutions and to adopt a code of eth-
ics for arbitrators. 3 The California Arbitrator Ethics Standards
set forth detailed requirements demanding that an arbitrator
disclose any relationships that could call an arbitrator's impar-
tiality into doubt and imposed a duty upon arbitrators to refuse
gifts from parties, to conduct the arbitration fairly and dili-
gently, to avoid ex parte communications with parties, to main-
tain confidentiality of information, and to not imply favoritism
in marketing.84 The California legislature also enacted limited
measures to regulate provider institutions that administer con-
sumer arbitrations. 5 Despite these steps towards regulating
funct Arbitration Panel, L.A. TIMES, July 1, 2000, at C2 (reporting that plain-
tiffs have "little hope of collecting damages" on their default judgment from
the now-defunct SCAA). The article also notes that "[d]espite the explosive
growth of private dispute resolution, no requirements exist for arbitration
firms or arbitrators to have legal training or be licensed, as even court report-
ers must." Id.
82. See, e.g., Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 938 P.2d 903, 922
(Cal. 1997) (finding, in part, that Kaiser had engaged in egregious conduct and
dilatory tactics in administering its compulsory arbitration process); Disco,
supra note 8, at 138 (analyzing the potential for bias because provider institu-
tions have a financial interest in arbitrations with repeat corporate parties);
Harrington, supra note 13, at 104 (stating that "[a]n arbitration provider
named to receive all disputes from one company may have an incentive to rule
in favor of the 'repeat player'" (quoting Marc L. Galanter, Why the 'Haves'
Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & SoC'Y
REV. 95 (1974))).
83. See CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. § 1281.92 (2003) (prohibiting providers from
administering consumer arbitrations where the provider has a financial rela-
tionship with a party); id. § 1281.96 (requiring the publication of consumer ar-
bitration information by providers); id. § 1284.3(a) (prohibiting providers from
administering arbitrations with "loser pays" requirements).
84. California Arbitrator Ethics Standards, supra note 33, Standards 1-
17.
85. CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. § 1281.92(a)-(b). The Code prohibits a private
arbitration company from administering a consumer arbitration
[i]f the company has, or within the preceding year has had, a financial
interest.., in any party or attorney for a party, or ... if any party or
attorney for a party has, or within the preceding year has had, any
type of financial interest in the private arbitration company.
Id.; see also id. § 1281.96 (requiring the publication of a range of data, includ-
ing the nonconsumer party names, arbitrator names, arbitrator fees, amount
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arbitral services, the laws "[aire not intended either to affect
any existing civil cause of action or to create any new civil
cause of action," with disqualification as the primary sanction.
California was also one of the few states to have legislation
codifying arbitral immunity."' However, the provision that ex-
pressly conferred immunity from civil liability for arbitrators
expired in 1997.88 The statute's repeal reinstated the state's
of the claim, nature of the dispute, outcome of the case, and number of times
nonconsumer has been subject to arbitration, if any, in the past); id. § 1284.3
(prohibiting arbitration providers from administering a case where the arbi-
tration clause contains a "loser pays" provision and requiring providers to
waive fees for indigent claimants (exclusive of arbitrator fees), and prohibiting
disclosures of information obtained by a private arbitration company (e.g., fi-
nancial condition, income, wealth, and fee waiver request) to any adverse
party or nonparty to the arbitration); id. § 170.1 (providing for disqualification
of any judge who has arranged for future employment or other compensated
service as a dispute resolution neutral arbitrator or who has discussed pro-
spective employment or service as a neutral within the previous two years).
Two other bills were not enacted: A.B. 1714, which attempted, inter alia, to
provide consumers with the opportunity to opt out of a contractual obligation
that named a particular provider, and A.B. 1713, which provided for "dis-
gorgement" of the provider's administrative fees if a court found a violation of
any of the above laws. The latter two bills were reintroduced in the 2003 ses-
sion but failed to win approval. See Opposition Kills Second California Con-
sumer Arbitration Bill (June 2, 2003), at http://www.adrworld.coml
opendocument.asp?Doc=B6AcdjcAIg&code=saNOemOO; see also infra note 94
and accompanying text. Similar legislation introduced in Texas was killed by
business opposition in the legislature. Business Opposition Kills Consumer
Arbitration Bill in Texas (July 7, 2003) (discussing proposed Texas state legis-
lation that would have prohibited "loser pays" clauses in consumer arbitration
agreements, limited consumer arbitration fees, and shifted most arbitration
costs to business), at http://www.adrworld.com/opendocument.asp?
Doc=pnCB6lxGrD&code=saNOemOO.
86. California Arbitrator Ethics Standards, supra note 33, Standard 1(d).
87. See Sponseller, supra note 63, at 434 n.119 (listing four states, in ad-
dition to California, which have codified absolute arbitral immunity). Few
states, however, have express immunity for arbitrators serving in a court-
annexed arbitration. See FLA. STAT. § 44.107 (2003) (providing immunity for
court-appointed mediators and arbitrators); MD. CODE. ANN. § 3-2A-04(g)
(2002) (stating an arbitrator should have immunity from suit); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 7A-37.01(e) (2002) (providing arbitrators in court-ordered and court-
annexed nonbinding arbitration "the same immunity as judges from civil li-
ability for their official conduct"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31b-4(4) (2002) ("[Aln
ADR provider is immune from all liability when conducting proceedings under
the rules of the Judicial Council and the provisions of this act, except for
wrongful disclosure of confidential information, to the same extent as a judge
of the courts in this state.").
88. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1280.1 (amended 1995) (repealed 1997) ("An
arbitrator has the immunity of a judicial officer from civil liability when acting
in the capacity of arbitrator under any statute or contract.... The immunity
afforded by this section shall supplement, and not supplant, any otherwise ap-
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
common law immunity for quasi-judicial acts of private arbitra-
tors, which is not entirely coherent.89 For example, case law de-
cided while the statute was in force extended immunity to arbi-
trators as well as to sponsoring institutions, despite the
absence of specific reference to sponsoring institutions in the
statute.90 Some decisions rendered before the statute's enact-
ment, such as Baar v. Tigerman, viewed arbitral immunity
more critically. 9' In Baar, the court held that although an arbi-
trator was entitled to immunity for actions taken in a quasi-
judicial capacity, arbitral immunity did not extend to liability
for failure to render an award, and that arbitral immunity did
not protect the sponsoring organization where the arbitrator
was not immune.92
Legislation proposed in the State Assembly Judiciary
Committee aimed to distinguish immunity accorded to arbitra-
tors for their decisional acts from the independent conduct of
provider institutions.93 The bill's remedy, as introduced in the
2003 legislative session, was limited to disgorgement of admin-
istrative fees in the event that a private arbitration company
administering a consumer arbitration violated any of the dis-
plicable common law or statutory immunity."). The provision was initially due
for repeal on January 1, 1991, but was twice amended. First, in 1990, the re-
peal date was extended to January 1, 1996, and then in 1995, the repeal date
was extended to January 1, 1997. Id. The provision has not been subsequently
amended and the statutory guarantee of arbitral immunity in California has
thus expired.
89. See 79 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 294 (1996), 1996 WL 737291 (Cal. A.G.)
(concluding that the statute's repeal reinstated the common law immunity ap-
plicable to judicial arbitrators).
90. See In re Marriage of Assemi, 872 P.2d 1190, 1198 (Cal. 1994) (extend-
ing the protection of judicial immunity to arbitrators because they perform the
function of adjudicating private rights); Am. Arbitration Ass'n v. Superior
Court, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 899, 900 (Cal.App. 2 Dist. 1992) (concluding that the
statute implicitly extended to the sponsoring organization); Coopers & Ly-
brand v. Superior Court, 260 Cal. Rptr. 713, 721 (Cal.App. 2 Dist. 1989) (hold-
ing that an arbitrator's misconduct or fraud will not void arbitral immunity;
the remedy for arbitrator misconduct lies in vacation of the award).
91. 189 Cal. Rptr. 834 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); see also United States v. City
of Hayward, 36 F.3d 837 (9th Cir. 1994) (refusing to extend arbitral immunity
to the City of Hayward as a sponsoring organization where the city appointed
a partisan arbitrator to preside over a mandatory arbitration).
92. Baar, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 836, 839.
93. See Hudson Sangree, Legislators Push Bills to Curb Arbitration Abuse,
L.A. DAILY J., Mar. 12, 2002, at 3 (describing A.B. 1713 as a "proposal to make
it clear that arbitration firms do not enjoy absolute immunity for wrongdoing,
as some courts have suggested").
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closure and reporting requirements.94
C. THE REVISED UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT'S ENDORSEMENT
OF BROAD ARBITRAL IMMUNITY AND PENALTIES FOR AUDACIOUS
CHALLENGES
Although arbitral immunity for private arbitrators and
provider institutions is not addressed in the FAA or most state
legislation, the drafters of the RUAA intended to provide nearly
absolute certainty that legal challenges to arbitral conduct are
barred.
1. The RUAA's Endorsement of Immunity for Arbitrators and
Provider Institutions
The RUAA, recently approved and recommended for en-
actment in all states by the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform Laws in 2000, explicitly endorses broad ar-
bitral immunity.95 Section 14 of the Act provides express civil
immunity to both arbitrators and arbitration provider institu-
tions:
(a) An arbitrator or an arbitration organization acting in that capacity
is immune from civil liability to the same extent as a judge of a court
of this State acting in a judicial capacity.
(b) The immunity afforded by this section supplements any immunity
under other law.
(c) The failure of an arbitrator to make a disclosure required by Sec-
tion 12 does not cause any loss of immunity under this section.'
To discourage parties from subpoenaing arbitrators, the
Act provides that arbitrators and representatives of arbitration
institutions are, like judges, "not competent to testify... and
may not be required to produce records as to any statement,
conduct, decision, or ruling occurring during the arbitration
94. Cal. A.B. 3030, signed by Governor Gray Davis in August 2002, was
contingent on approval of another bill that did not pass. Both have been rein-
troduced in the 2003 legislative session as A.B. 1713. See California Assembly
Revives Vetoed Consumer Arbitration Bills (Mar. 3, 2003), at
http://www.adrworld.com/opendocument.asp?Doc=srDOHuySrN&code=saNOe
mOO. No action has been taken on the proposed legislation. See OFFICIAL CAL.
LEGISLATIVE INFORMATION, CURRENT BILL STATUS, http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/
pub/bill/asm/ab_1701-1750/ab_1713-bill 20030912_status.html (last visited
Nov. 23, 2003).
95. RUAA § 14 (2000), http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/uarba/
arbitrat1213.pdf.
96. Id. § 14(a)-(c).
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proceeding.""7 An exception is made for the limited circum-
stance of an arbitrator, arbitration organization, or representa-
tive of an arbitration organization filing a claim against a
party, such as for payment of fees, or to respond to a party's va-
catur action based on alleged arbitral corruption, fraud, or evi-
dent partiality. The statute deters attempts to challenge arbi-
tral acts by imposing an attorney fees penalty against parties
unsuccessful in litigation against arbitrators or provider insti-
tutions.8
2. Extension to Provider Institutions
The RUAA expressly includes arbitration provider institu-
tions under the immunity blanket, reasoning that such cover-
age is appropriate
to the extent that [the provider institutions] are acting "in certain
roles and with certain responsibilities" that are comparable to those
of a judge. This immunity to neutral arbitration institutions is appro-
priate because the duties that they perform in administering the arbi-
tration process are the functional equivalent of the roles and respon-
sibilities of judges administering the adjudication process in a court of
law."
The commentary explains the impact of the immunity pro-
vision, stating that "[Slection 14(c) is included to insure that, if
an arbitrator fails to make a disclosure required by Section 12,
then the typical remedy is vacatur... and not loss of arbitral
immunity under Section 14. Such a result is similar to the ef-
fect of judicial immunity." °0 These provisions of the RUAA cod-
ify a number of court decisions extending absolute immunity
from civil liability to arbitrators, as well as to provider institu-
tions in some cases.101
D. EVALUATING THE RUAA IMMUNITY PROPOSAL
As private arbitration has proliferated as an often manda-
tory process for resolving consumer legal disputes, the business
97. Id. § 14(d). The comments note that three other states currently pro-
vide some form of arbitral immunity in their arbitration statutes. Id. § 14 cmt.
1.
98. Id. § 14(e) (imposing the sanction of attorney fees and costs payable to
the arbitrator, organization, or representative).
99. Id. § 14 cmt. 2 (adding that "[tihere is substantial precedent for this
conclusion" (citations omitted)).
100. Id. § 14 cmt. 4.
101. Id. §14 cmt. 2 (listing case law extending immunity to arbitration or-
ganizations).
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of arbitration has become more widespread and lucrative.
States are now asked by the RUAA to codify a broad and vague
rule that equates the private arbitration industry with public
judges by conferring upon them the same level of absolute im-
munity from civil liability.
In reference to a societal concern that the trend toward
privatized justice may result in increased settlements reached
by coercion, in secrecy, and without legal accountability or due
process protection, Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Chair of
the CPR-Commission on Ethics and Standards of Practice in
ADR at Georgetown University, comments:
As some third party neutrals are granted immunity because they are
either servicing the judicial system or acting in "quasi-judicial" ca-
pacities, some worry that there will be no way to monitor competence
or quality and our legal system will not only fail to produce publicly
declared precedents, but will produce "bad" private justice.0 2
Professor Menkel-Meadow also notes that "[in other situa-
tions, parties (or the neutral) have been accused of violating
contract terms or good faith by breaching confidentiality, en-
gaging in self-dealing and promotion and rapacious competitive
behavior."' She is concerned that "our flexible, adaptive and
creative processes, 'alternatives' to litigation and court have
produced their own abuses... Our 'informal' system is in need
of 'policing' and ethical sanctions (as well as other internal
regulations) may be necessary in order to maintain public con-
fidence and legitimacy."
10 4
What is the appropriate level of response, regulation, and
immunity? Unfettered immunity? Part II of this Article exam-
ines the basis for arbitral immunity and the aptness of the
analogy to public judges, with the aim to articulate a standard
that balances the need for arbitrators and providers to engage
in their arbitral duties with the policy goal of ensuring ac-
countability and providing protection to arbitration consumers.
II. JUDICIAL IMMUNITY AND ITS PROGENY:
THE DOCTRINAL INTENT, LIMITED SCOPE, AND
WAYWARD EXPANSION IN ARBITRATION
Immunity for arbitrators and provider institutions is prem-
102. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution: New
Issues, No Answers From the Adversary Conception of Lawyers' Responsibili-
ties, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 407, 419 (1997).
103. Id.
104. Id.
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ised on an analogy to judicial immunity. The United States Su-
preme Court has never specifically endorsed arbitrator immu-
nity, although the doctrine is established in many state and
federal cases' 5 and in a few states that have arbitral immunity
legislation.16 Part II of this Article explores the judicial immu-
nity doctrine and its limited extension to certain public offi-
cials, and then examines the basis for extending judicial im-
munity to arbitrators and provider institutions.
A. THE PRECURSOR: JUDICIAL IMMUNITY
The law has long accorded absolute immunity from civil li-
ability to federal and state judges who act in their judicial ca-
pacity.0 7 The doctrine of judicial immunity derived from Eng-
lish common law and developed as the appellate system
emerged as a means to correct errors of the court.108 The policy
justifications underlying the doctrine are to ensure the finality
of judicial decisions, to preserve judicial independence, and to
protect the integrity of the judicial process by preventing inter-
ference in judicial decision making that arises from harassment
105. See J. Randolph Block, Stump v. Sparkman and the History of Judi-
cial Immunity, 1980 DuKE L.J. 879, 897-920 (exploring case precedent for ju-
dicial immunity in the United States). While selective state courts recognized
versions of judicial immunity, the Supreme Court formally articulated its ver-
sion in 1868. Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. 523, 533 (1868) ("To secure the
maximum of impartiality, a judge must be protected from personal responsi-
bility for his errors."); see also Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347 (1872) (stat-
ing that "[a] judge shall be free to act upon his own convictions without appre-
hension of personal consequence to himself"). In short, a judge enjoys absolute
civil immunity from suit so long as a contested action is judicial in nature, and
is not taken in the complete absence of jurisdiction. Stump v. Sparkman, 435
U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978).
106. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.107 (1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-
37.1(e) (2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31b-4 (2002).
107. See, e.g., Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 10-12 (1991) (according immu-
nity to a state judge against the claim that he knowingly authorized and ap-
proved excessive force against the plaintiff); Sparkman, 435 U.S. at 351-64
(holding a state judge absolutely immune in an action by a daughter alleging
that a judge, without authority and with malice, approved a mother's request
for the tubal ligation of a "somewhat retarded" fifteen-year-old girl); Bradley,
80 U.S. at 354 (establishing that judicial immunity from civil suit is absolute).
108. Jay M. Feinman & Roy S. Cohen, Suing Judges: History and Theory,
31 S.C. L. REV. 201, 203-47 (1980) (asserting that English law began with a
position of general liability for judges but developed some limited immunity,
and as the law developed in America, the power of appellate courts to correct
error was offered as one justification for the expansion of judicial immunity);
cf. Block, supra note 105, at 884 (noting that collateral attacks on judgments
by way of suits against judges were disallowed because it strengthened the
burgeoning appellate system).
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or intimidation by the parties. 9
Despite this persuasive rationale, the doctrine is subject to
specific limitations, even with respect to public judges."0 First,
immunity does not extend to judges who act clearly without
subject matter jurisdiction."' Second, immunity is predicated
on the challenged action being a "judicial act."112 Finally, the
doctrine does not extend to the criminal acts of judges.1 1 3 Abso-
lute judicial civil immunity, subject to the above limitations,
bars actions against judges for damages brought under section
1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, now 42 U.S.C. § 1983."M How-
ever, this immunity does not preclude § 1983 actions for injunc-
tive relief against a judicial officer for alleged violations of con-
stitutional rights while acting in a judicial capacity, nor does
immunity preclude an award of attorney fees."1 In addition,
judges can be subject to a variety of public remedies for their
misconduct, such as discipline for violations of the code of judi-
cial conduct, or removal from office via the political process if
the judge was elected rather than appointed . Appellate re
109. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) ("[A judge] should not
have to fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigation.... Im-
posing such a burden on judges would contribute not to principled and fearless
decision-making but to intimidation."); Bradley, 80 U.S. at 347-49 (stressing
the public need for "independence of the judges" and stating that a judge "shall
be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal con-
sequences to himself'); see also Block, supra note 105, at 880 (discussing policy
rationales).
110. See Bradley, 80 U.S. at 347, 352 (adopting two constraints on absolute
immunity). This framework, adopted by the Supreme Court in 1871, continues
to guide judicial immunity from civil suits today. See, e.g., Sparkman, 435 U.S.
at 356-60 (noting that a judge enjoys absolute civil immunity from suit so long
as a contested action is judicial in nature, and is not taken in the complete ab-
sence of jurisdiction).
111. Bradley, 80 U.S. at 351-52.
112. Id. at 347.
113. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 503 (1974) (noting that "we have
never held that the performance of the duties of judicial ... officers requires or
contemplates the immunization of otherwise criminal deprivations of constitu-
tional rights" or conduct in violation of Acts of Congress).
114. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 548.
115. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 524-25 (1984) (recognizing, pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1988, civil suit and attorney fees are available to an
individual seeking injunctive relief against a state magistrate who jailed indi-
viduals for non-jailable misdemeanors); Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers
Union of the United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 735 (1980) (suggesting that
immunity from liability in damages may not bar prospective or injunctive re-
lief against a judge).
116. See generally MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2002) (setting forth
standards for judicial conduct). Under the Code, judges are required to "act at
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view, equitable relief, and procedural writs, such as manda-
mus, also offer parties a remedy to compel judicial officers to
perform legal duties.
117
In actions for damages, the Supreme Court has rarely
found an absence of subject matter jurisdiction for public
judges and has been considerably generous in construing judi-
cial acts. In Stump v. Sparkman, a case was brought against a
judge who had approved a mother's ex parte request for the
tubal ligation of a "somewhat retarded" fifteen-year-old girl.
118
Following the judge's order, the girl went to the hospital and
was told she was having her appendix removed."9 After marry-
ing two years later, the girl learned of the mendacious opera-
tion worked upon her and brought a suit for damages. 2 °
Even under these unsettling circumstances, the Court
could not agree that there was a "clear absence of all jurisdic-
tion" because Indiana law gave Judge Stump general jurisdic-
tion to hear any type of case.' 21 Under the Sparkman Court's
sprawling conception of jurisdiction, this limitation on judicial
immunity is virtually nonexistent, 2  unless a law expressly
prohibits jurisdiction over a specified area (for example, a fam-
ily court judge hears and sentences a criminal case in spite of
plain state statutory language restricting jurisdiction to family
proceedings).
23
Judge Stump's tubal ligation order was also held to be a
all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and im-
partiality of the judiciary," and violation of the law is grounds for discipline.
Id. at Canon 2. Specifically, judges are required to decide matters assigned to
them and perform their duties without bias or prejudice. Id. at Canon 3. The
purpose of the Code is not to create "a basis for civil liability or criminal prose-
cution." Id. at Preamble. Violations, however, may be "sufficient to result in
involuntary retirement, removal, or censure." Sponseller, supra note 63, at
427.
117. See 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (2000) ("The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or
employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to
the plaintiff.").
118. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 351 (1978).
119. Id. at 353.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 357.
122. Caroline Turner English, Stretching the Doctrine of Absolute Quasi-
Judicial Immunity: Wagshal v. Foster, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 759, 764 (1995)
("As [Sparkman] demonstrates, the 'lack of jurisdiction' restriction is not a
meaningful limitation on the doctrine ofjudicial immunity.").
123. See also Sparkman, 435 U.S. at 357 n.7 (providing an illustration dis-
tinguishing lack of jurisdiction and excess of jurisdiction).
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"judicial act."124 The Court directed that a judicial act determi-
nation should look "to the nature of the act itself' and "to the
expectations of the parties."12 5 Although Judge Stump's ap-
proval was not the product of a formal adversary proceeding,
the Court found that "[s]tate judges with general jurisdiction
not infrequently are called upon in their official capacity to ap-
prove petitions relating to the affairs of minors, as for example,
a petition to settle a minor's claim."26 This sufficed to make
Judge Stump's order a judicial act. 27 Combined with the de-
termination that jurisdiction was not clearly absent, the Court
cloaked Judge Stump with absolute immunity from civil liabil-
ity128
The Court made a similarly generous determination of a
judicial act in Mireles v. Waco.19 In Mireles, an angry judge al-
legedly directed police officers to use excessive force in sum-
moning an absent attorney.' The Court held that this conduct
of bringing parties before the court constituted a judicial act,
counseling that the nature of a judge's action should be consid-
ered at a level of abstraction, since "if only the particular act in
question were to be scrutinized, then any mistake... [would
be] 'nonjudicial."'0
The "judicial act" limitation on absolute judicial immunity
is somewhat circularly expressed in terms of a function that
could be performed only by a judge.1 32 Although a judge's inter-
124. Id. at 360. The Sparkman Court's conception of judicial act has been
criticized by commentators. See e.g., K.G. Jan Pillai, Rethinking Judicial Im-
munity for the Twenty-First Century, 39 HOW. L.J. 95, 98 (1995) ("What consti-
tutes a 'judicial act' deserving immunity has been so open-ended as to encom-
pass even the blatantly outrageous and unethical conduct of judges which
have the most remote and tenuous links to normal and proper judicial func-
tions.").
125. Sparkman, 435 U.S. at 362.
126. Id. at 361-62.
127. Id. at 362-63.
128. Id.
129. 502 U.S. 9 (1991).
130. Id. at 10.
131. Id. at 12.
132. See, e.g., Sparkman, 435 U.S. at 362 ("[Wlhether an act by a judge is a
judicial' one relate[s] to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a func-
tion normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e.,
whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity."); see also Forrester
v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227 (1988) (stating that although there is no "precise
and general definition of the class of acts" which are entitled to judicial immu-
nity, there is "an intelligible distinction between judicial acts and the adminis-
trative, legislative, or executive functions that judges may on occasion be as-
479
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
action with parties in a judicial capacity is broadly construed as
a judicial act, it has long been recognized that some regular
conduct of judges is administrative, not judicial, and therefore
not protected.' For example, at English common law, "seven-
teenth and eighteenth century courts also came to realize that
many of a justice's administrative duties were not judicial in
the accepted sense, and that the mere exercise of discretion
should not automatically insulate a justice from the conse-
quences of an arbitrary exercise of his administrative pow-
ers."
134
Significantly, the Supreme Court has distinguished be-
tween immune "judicial acts" and other "administrative, legis-
lative, or executive functions that judges may on occasion be
assigned by law to perform."35 In Forrester v. White, the Court
employed a functional approach, examining the nature of the
functions performed and entrusted, rather than the identity of
the actor who performed them, in order "to evaluate the effect
that exposure to particular forms of liability would likely have
on the appropriate exercise of those functions."36 Thus, the
Court held that a state judge, who allegedly discriminated
against an employee on the basis of sex, had acted in an admin-
istrative, not judicial, capacity, and thus was not entitled to ab-
solute immunity from a § 1983 damages suit. 37 The Court
signed by law to perform"); Pillai, supra note 124, at 111-12 (distinguishing
between "judicial acts" and other "official acts" which are not judicial, such as
.a judge's legislative, executive, and administrative or ministerial acts even
when they are taken in his official capacity").
133. Block, supra note 105, at 890.
134. Id.
135. Forrester, 484 U.S. at 227.
136. Id. at 224. The Court acknowledged that the threat of liability can
have salutary effects to encourage officials to perform their duties in a lawful
manner, yet such threats can also "create perverse incentives that operate to
inhibit officials in the proper performance of their duties," which may detract
rather than contribute to the rule of law. Id. at 223. Because of "the undeni-
able tension between official immunities and the ideal of the rule of law," the
Court counseled that claims of absolute immunity are sparingly recognized.
Id. at 223-25 (citing the legislative and executive immunity provided under
the Constitution as examples); see also id. at 230 ("Absolute immunity, how-
ever, is 'strong medicine, justified only when the danger of officials' being de-
flected from the effective performance of their duties 'is very great.'" (quoting
Forrester v. White, 792 F.2d 647, 660 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J., dissenting))).
The Court offered that a category of "qualified immunity" avoids "unnecessar-
ily extending the scope of the traditional concept of absolute immunity." Id. at
224.
137. Forrester, 484 U.S. at 221, 229 (holding that a state court judge's act of
demoting staff personnel was administrative).
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added that "[a]dministrative decisions, even though they may
be essential to the very functioning of the courts," are not judi-
cial acts. Similarly, the act of jury selection was considered a
ministerial function that could be performed by either a judge
or nonjudicial personnel in Ex parte Virginia. 39 Thus, a judge
who excluded African-Americans from jury lists was not im-
mune.4 0 Neither did judicial immunity apply to judges acting to
promulgate a code of conduct for attorneys because such an act
"was not an act of adjudication." 1
B. LIMITED EXTENSION OF JUDICIAL IMMUNITY TO OTHER
PUBLIC OFFICIALS
The Supreme Court has also recognized that, in certain
situations, the policy considerations that warrant immunity for
judges also apply to other public officials exercising discretion-
ary functions, such as administrative law judges and prosecu-lr 141
tors. In Butz v. Economou , the Supreme Court set forth a
three-prong functional approach to analyze whether immunity
may extend to other public officials. This test examines (1)
whether the official acted in a comparable quasi-judicial or pub-
lic adjudicatory capacity, (2) the likelihood that harassment or
intimidation by personal liability would interfere with the per-
formance of the quasi-judicial duties, and significantly, (3)
whether the system has procedural safeguards that would ade-
quately protect against unconstitutional conduct by the im-
138. Id. at 228 (citing as an administrative decision the duty of selection of
jurors, as held in Ex parte Virginia); see also Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478,
492-96 (1991) (declining to extend absolute immunity to a state prosecutor for
the act of giving legal advice to a police officer but extending immunity for in-
court conduct).
139. 100 U.S. 339, 348 (1879) (noting that the nonjudicial character of jury
selection does not change merely because it was performed by a judge). The
Court noted that because
[tihe duty of selecting jurors might as well have been committed to a
private person as to one holding the office of a judge ... it is merely a
ministerial act, as much so as the act of a sheriff holding an execu-
tion, in determining upon what piece of property he will make a levy,
or the act of a roadmaster in selecting laborers to work upon the
roads. That the jurors are selected for a court makes no difference.
Id.; see also Forrester, 484 U.S. at 228 (stating that the criminal charge raised
against the judge in Ex parte Virginia did not limit the analysis).
140. Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 348.
141. Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc.,
446 U.S. 719, 731 (1980).
142. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
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mune official. 4 1 Such safeguards include "[tihe insulation of the
[official] from political influence, the importance of precedent in
resolving controversies, the adversary nature of the process,
and the correctability of error on appeal."
144
In extending absolute immunity to executive branch offi-
cials engaged in administrative adjudication, Butz emphasized
that, because other means within the judicial process exist to
correct errors, decision makers in the judicial process must be
free to exercise their discretion without fear of personal conse-
quences. 45 With this safeguard in place, the importance of pre-
serving independent judgment outweighs the risk of an official
committing an unconstitutional act while presiding at an
agency hearing.'46 Thus, as the "agency officials [who perform
functions analogous to those of a prosecutor] must make the
decision to move forward with an administrative proceeding
free from intimidation or harassment, 1 4 7 those officials who
make decisions in proceedings are entitled to immunity from
liability for their participation in that decision. 48 Similar con-
siderations led the Court to accord immunity to certain public
officials who must perform quasi-adjudicatory functions and
discretionary actions. 4 9 Only private individuals, specifically
143. Id. at 512.
144. Id.
145. Id. (extending absolute immunity to executive branch officials engaged
in administrative adjudication based on the nature of the official's functions,
the likelihood of harassing lawsuits, and the procedural safeguards in place to
control misconduct).
146. Id. at 514.
147. Id. at 516.
148. Id. at 514.
149. See Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292, 297-98 (1988) (extending abso-
lute immunity from state law tort claims to executive officials only when their
conduct is discretionary); Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 203 (1985) (dis-
tinguishing between absolute and qualified immunity and according the
prison discipline committee only qualified immunity because it did not per-
form a "classic" adjudicatory function and was not "independent"); Mitchell v.
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 521-24 (1985) (applying an analysis similar to the Butz
Court in according qualified immunity to the Attorney General in national
security functions); Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 561 (1978) (agreeing
that prison administrators are entitled to qualified immunity); Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 410, 423 n.20 (1976) (granting prosecutors absolute
quasi-judicial immunity for their functions of initiating and pursuing criminal
prosecutions and noting that grand jurors and prosecutors are afforded abso-
lute immunity because they "exercise a discretionary judgment" comparable to
that of a judge); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 577 (1975) (indicating
qualified immunity applies to the state hospital superintendent); Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975) (holding that public school administrators
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witnesses and jurors, who assist the public judicial system in
decision-making activities have been specifically included in
this extended immunity."' As with the nonjudicial acts of pub-
lic judges, the Court has declined to extend immunity to public
officials for nondiscretionary acts. Thus, because court report-
ers do not exercise discretion in performing their duties, they
are not immune from civil liability.""
Again, judges and public officials are immune from civil li-
ability because they exercise discretionary judgment based on
the evidence presented to them.5 2 It is the functional similarity
of their judgments to those of a judge that has resulted in both
grand jurors and prosecutors being referred to as "quasi-
judicial" officers, and their immunities being termed "quasi-
judicial" as well . Even where immunity for public officials is
warranted, the presumption is that qualified, not absolute,
immunity is sufficient to protect government officials in the ex-
ercise of their duties.' In these cases, the official seeking im-
munity bears the burden of showing that such immunity is jus-
tified for the function in question.
155
are entitled to qualified immunity); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48
(1974) (extending qualified immunity to state officials against charges that
they intentionally, recklessly, willfully, and wantonly ordered National Guard
members to perform allegedly illegal acts resulting in university students'
deaths, on the grounds that the scope of immunity correlated with the scope of
the discretion, responsibilities of the particular office, and the circumstances
existing at the time the action was taken); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367,
379 (1951) (finding legislators absolutely immune from § 1983 suits).
150. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 334 (1983) (extending immunity for
witnesses at trial). The Supreme Court has not specifically endorsed an exten-
sion of absolute immunity to private arbitrators. See infra Parts II.C, III.A
(discussing the functional equivalency of arbitrators).
151. Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 435 (1993) ("We are
also unpersuaded by the contention that our 'functional approach' to immunity
requires that absolute immunity be extended to court reporters because they
are 'part of the judicial function." (citation omitted)).
152. Id. ("When judicial immunity is extended to officials other than
judges, it is because their judgments are 'functional[ly] comparab[le]' to those
of judges-that is, because they, too, 'exercise a discretionary judgment' as a
part of their function." (citing Imbler, 424 U.S. at 423 n.20)).
153. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 423 n.20.
154. Id. at 424-29.
155. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988); Butz v. Economou, 438
U.S. 478, 506 (1978).
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C. EXTENSION TO ARBITRATORS: THE ARBITRAL IMMUNITY
DOCTRINE
Based on a presumed analogy between public judges and
private arbitrators, courts have broadly extended absolute judi-
cial immunity to private arbitrators and provider institutions.
This extension of judicial immunity is largely based on the no-
tion that the role of an arbitrator is, under Butz, "functionally
equivalent" to the role of a judge, with a corresponding need to
protect the integrity and finality of the arbitration and deci-
sion-making process from reprisals by dissatisfied parties.
The rationale is that arbitrators are required to exercise inde-
pendent judgment and therefore need to be free from the threat
of liability for their decisions. 57 Immunity has also been justi-
fied as socially useful and as a recruitment tool, since shielding
arbitrators from suit encourages individuals to volunteer as ar-
biters.5 Without such immunity, few would be willing to serve
as arbitrators.'59 Notably absent, however, is mention of the
disparity in procedural safeguards as present in the public jus-
tice system and lacking in private arbitration.
1. Historical Development of Arbitral Immunity
A history of arbitral immunity in the United States can be
156. Galuska v. N.Y. Stock Exch., No. 99-3522, 2000 WL 347851, at *2 (7th
Cir. Apr. 3, 2000); New England Cleaning Servs. v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 199
F.3d 542, 545 (1st Cir. 1999); Olson v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 85 F.3d 381,
382 (8th Cir. 1996).
157. See, e.g., Lundgren v. Freeman, 307 F.2d 104, 117 (9th Cir. 1962) ("If
their decisions can thereafter be questioned in suits brought against them by
either party ... their decisions will be governed more by the fear of such suits
than by their own unfettered judgment as to the merits of the matter they
must decide.").
158. See Arthur A. Chaykin, The Liabilities and Immunities of Mediators:
A Hostile Environment for Model Legislation, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
47, 77 (1986) ("The granting of an immunity is a matter of public policy that
balances the social utility of the immunity against the social loss of being un-
able to attack the immune defendant."); see also Tamari v. Conrad, 552 F.2d
778, 781 (7th Cir. 1977) ("[Ilndividuals ... cannot be expected to volunteer to
arbitrate disputes if they can be caught up in [a lawsuit].").
159. See generally Chaykin, supra note 158. No empirical study confirms
the assumption that either arbitrators or arbitration provider institutions
would refuse to participate in arbitration without immunity. Cf. New England
Cleaning Servs., 199 F.3d at 546 ("Failure to extend immunity to the AAA in
these circumstances could discourage it from sponsoring future arbitrations.").
This concern seemingly also applies to many other skilled and noble profes-
sionals, such as doctors and lawyers, who nonetheless are not immune from
liability by law or contract.
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traced back as early as 1880 in Jones v. Brown.6 ° In Jones, a
tribunal was selected to arbitrate the differences of N.B. Brown
and William Harper. 61 The arbitration allegedly adjourned be-
fore Brown was given an opportunity to submit all his evidence,
and no further proceedings were held. 162 Without the knowledge
of the third arbitrator, two arbitrators allegedly conspired to
decide against Brown for $41,000.163 Upset, Brown refused to
pay $240 in arbitrator fees. One of the arbitrators, O.C.L.
Jones, brought suit for payment, and Brown counterclaimed for
$1000 in damages allegedly resulting from Jones's corrupt acts
as arbitrator.
165
The Jones court assumed that the arbitrator had a judge-
like role and proceeded to see if the arbitrator's actions were
judicial. The court determined that an arbitrator's acts of ad-
journing a proceeding and rendering an award were compara-
ble to a judge's act of "reducing an opinion to writing. " 166 Thus,
the arbitrator was held to have acted in a judicial, not ministe-
rial, capacity.16 Accordingly, as a judge is not "liable to civil ac-
tions for judicial acts," neither was the arbitrator. 6 '
Like Jones, ensuing cases did not compare the similarities
and differences between the roles and acts of private arbitra-
tors and public judges in any detail. However, citing Jones with
approval, these cases articulate the same justifications for ex-
tending judicial immunity to arbitrators: to protect the decision
maker's independence, to protect against fear of reprisal by a
disgruntled party, and to provide a social benefit to the public
by encouraging individual service as an arbitrator. 69 Few early
160. 6 N.W. 140, 142-43 (Iowa 1880) (ruling that an arbitrator is immune
from fraud claim liability for judicial acts); see also Shiver v. Ross, 3 S.C.L. (1
Brev.) 293, 293 (1803) (providing testimonial immunity to an arbitrator called
as a witness to examine an alleged error in an arbitral award and holding that
impeachment of an award would not be considered absent arbitrator miscon-
duct or error on the face of the award).
161. Jones, 6 N.W. at 141.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 142.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 143; see also Tamari v. Conrad, 552 F.2d 778, 780 (7th Cir.
1977) (holding that arbitrators are immune from suit regarding questions in-
volving their authority to resolve a dispute).
169. See Hoosac Tunnel Dock & Elevator Co. v. O'Brien, 137 Mass. 424,
426 (Mass. 1884) ("An arbitrator is a quasi judicial officer, under our laws, ex-
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cases extended immunity to private individuals, such as archi-
tects, appraisers, or members of boards of directors, who en-
gaged in discretionary conduct that was "functionally compara-
ble" to the adjudicative decision-making process.7 ° Although
recognizing that many aspects of a professional's tasks involve
discretionary determinations, other courts do not equate such
professionals with immune adjudicatory decision makers, but
rather hold them to the standards of their respective profes-
sions."'
ercising judicial functions. There is as much reason in his case for protecting
and insuring his impartiality, independence, and freedom from undue influ-
ences, as in the case of a judge or juror."); Melady v. S. St. Paul Live Stock
Exch., 171 N.W. 806, 807 (Minn. 1919) ("Any man [serving] in a judicial capac-
ity ought to feel free to act on his own convictions, uninfluenced by the fear of
consequences personal to himself ... . [Immunity] ... should be extended to
all to whom the law or the agreement of the parties commits the exercise of
authority of an essentially judicial nature."); Babylon Milk & Cream Co. v.
Horvitz, 151 N.Y.S.2d 221, 224 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1956) ("[Alrbitrators must be
free from the fear of reprisals by an unsuccessful litigant .... I see no reason
to distinguish between a judge and an arbitrator... . [The same rule of im-
munity should apply to arbitrators as applies to the judiciary, inasmuch as the
same reasons of public policy are applicable.").
170. See, e.g., Lundgren v. Freeman, 307 F.2d 104, 119 (9th Cir. 1962)
(holding that architects, authorized by contract to resolve disputes between an
owner and a contractor, acted as quasi-arbitrators and were immune from tor-
tious interference claim); Hutchins v. Merrill, 84 A. 412, 416 (Me. 1912)
(granting immunity from a negligence claim against a surveyor, whose ap-
praisal of plaintiffs' timber was binding on the parties to a service contract);
Melady, 171 N.W. at 807 (granting immunity to a board of directors of an ex-
change empowered by statute to arbitrate matters concerning its membership,
against charges of malicious action in finding a member guilty of uncommer-
cial conduct); cf. E.C. Ernst, Inc. v. Manhattan Constr. Co. of Tex., 551 F.2d
1026, 1033-34 (5th Cir. 1977), modified, 559 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1997) (reject-
ing immunity for architects serving as arbitrators where the alleged wrong-
doing was a failure to render decisions, as opposed on an error in decision
making).
171. Levine v. Wiss & Co., 478 A.2d 397, 402 (N.J. 1984) (holding that
court-appointed accountants who evaluated the value of a business were not
entitled to arbitral immunity because they were merely acting as assessors,
not decision makers); see also Russell L. Wald, Annotation, Accountant's Mal-
practice Liability to Client, 92 A.L.R.3d 396, 400-01 (1979). Wald notes:
As in the case of lawyers, doctors, architects, engineers, and others
engaged in rendering professional services for compensation, it is im-
plied in all contracts for the employment of public accountants that
they will render their services with that degree of skill, care, knowl-
edge, and judgment usually possessed and exercised by members of
that profession in the particular locality, in accordance with accepted
professional standards and in good faith without fraud or collusion.
While not insurers against damage, it is generally recognized that ac-
countants may be held liable to clients for damages resulting from
fraud, misconduct, or negligence in their professional undertaking;
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Other early instances of arbitral immunity arose in cases
involving labor arbitration.'72 In these cases, courts noted the
essential role that arbitrators regularly perform in labor dis-
putes and emphasized that labor arbitrators develop law. 173 Na-
tional labor law declares that the policy for settlement of labor-
management disputes is through collective bargaining,7 4 and
arbitration is a central feature of that process. Typically, courts
and, as in other like situations, they are liable for the acts and omis-
sions of their subordinates.
The courts have rejected contentions that accountants were
shielded from malpractice liability to their clients on grounds of judi-
cial immunity as quasi-arbitrators.
Id. See generally Constance Frisby Fain, Accountant Liability, 21 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 355 (1994) (discussing various grounds for accountant liability); Patricia
A. McCoy, Realigning Auditors' Incentives, 35 CONN. L. REV. 989, 1002 (2003)
(noting the availability of malpractice action against accountants).
172. See Int'l United Auto Workers v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 701 F.2d
1181, 1186 (6th Cir. 1983) (finding a labor arbitrator who ruled on ERISA
claims immune from liability for acts committed within his official capacity);
Cahn v. Int'l Ladies' Garment Union, 311 F.2d 113, 114-15 (3d Cir. 1962) (per
curiam) (affirming dismissal of conspiracy claims against a labor arbitrator
and holding the arbitrator immune against challenges brought by either party
arising out of his conduct in his arbitral capacity); Babylon Milk & Cream Co.
v. Horvitz, 151 N.Y.S.2d 221, 224 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1956) (dismissing an em-
ployer's claim against a labor arbitrator alleging collusion with union officials
on the grounds that "like other judicial officers, arbitrators must be free from
the fear of reprisals by an unsuccessful litigant ... [and] must of necessity be
uninfluenced by any fear of consequences for their acts"), affd, 165 N.Y.S.2d
717 (N.Y. App. Div. 1957); Hill v. Aro Corp., 263 F. Supp. 324, 326 (N.D. Ohio
1967) (finding a labor arbitrator immune from claims for his conduct in capac-
ity as an arbitrator and noting the important role of the labor arbitrator in the
developing federal common law of labor relations); see also Ozark Air Lines,
Inc. v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 797 F.2d 557, 564 (8th Cir. 1986) (noting that de-
creasing an arbitration board's immunity diminishes its impartiality and effi-
cacy); Fong v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 1340, 1343-44 (N.D. Cal. 1977)
(stating that arbitrators are "independent decision-makers who have no obli-
gation to defend themselves").
173. Hill, 263 F. Supp. at 326 ("[Tlhere is not the slightest doubt about the
all-important role of the labor arbitrator in the developing federal common law
of labor relations."); see also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57
(1974) (noting that arbitrators have authority only to enforce collective bar-
gaining agreements, not statutory claims, and that they are chosen because of
their expertise in the "law of the shop, not the law of the land").
174. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 171(b) (2000) (encourag-
ing "the settlement of issues between employers and employees through collec-
tive bargaining... [including] voluntary arbitration"); see also United Steel-
workers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960)
(stressing the "federal policy of settling labor disputes by arbitration"). The
Federal Arbitration Act does not establish an independent basis for federal
subject matter jurisdiction. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15-16
(1984).
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limit the arbitrator's authority to matters involving interpreta-
tions under the collective bargaining agreement.175 Individual
union members retain rights to judicial resolution of other
statutory or common law claims, unless expressly waived.
176
2. Extension to Regulated Provider Institutions
Although arbitral immunity, like judicial immunity, his-
torically applied only to the decision maker involved in the dis-
cretionary process of adjudicating disputes (arbitrator or
judge), the doctrine evolved in cases involving claims against
providers or sponsoring institutions in federal securities indus-• 177
try disputes. As with labor cases, arbitration is the tradi-
tional and generally exclusive means of resolving securities in-
dustry related complaints. Federal law also highly regulates
the securities industry. Providers or sponsoring organizations,
such as the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD),
are congressionally mandated self-regulatory institutions sub-
ject to oversight by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC).' 7 The Fifth Circuit described these institutions as
175. United Steelworkers of Am., 363 U.S. at 597 (giving substantial defer-
ence to an arbitrator's contractual interpretation); N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v.
United Steelworkers of Am., 243 F.3d 345, 347 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting the ar-
bitrator's authority of contract interpretation); see also Van Wezel Stone, su-
pra note 1, at 1010-12 (noting significant deference by the courts, as well as
the National Labor Relations Board, to labor arbitral decisions).
176. Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv., 525 U.S. 70, 80 (1998) (requiring a
"clear and unmistakable" waiver of a union employee before a court could
compel a federal statutory claim involving disability discrimination to arbitra-
tion).
177. See Olson v. Nat'l Ass'n. of Sec. Dealers, 85 F.3d 381 (8th Cir. 1996)
("A sponsoring organization is immune from civil liability for improperly se-
lecting an arbitration panel, even when the selection violates the organiza-
tion's own rules."); Austern v. Chi. Bd. Options Exch., Inc., 898 F.2d 882, 886-
87 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that "arbitrators in contractually agreed upon arbi-
tration proceedings are absolutely immune from liability in damages for all
acts within the scope of the arbitral process," and that the options exchange, in
sponsoring and administering the arbitration proceeding, was immune from
suit for alleged failure to follow its own policies regarding panel composition
and notice of proceeding); Austin Mun. Sec., Inc. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers,
Inc., 757 F.2d 676, 691-92 (5th Cir. 1985); Corey v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 691 F.2d
1205, 1210 (6th Cir. 1982) (holding that the defendant, "acting through its ar-
bitrators, is immune from civil liability for the acts of the arbitrators arising
out of contractually agreed upon arbitration," and stating that the FAA pro-
vided the exclusive remedy for challenging the award).
178. See Austin Mun. Sec., Inc., 757 F.2d at 679-80, 686 (explaining the
extensive regulatory framework governing self-regulatory agencies such as the
NASD, and registered stock exchanges, including the NYSE).
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"quasi-governmental," akin to an agent of the SEC.179
Thus, courts have extended the cloak of arbitrator immu-
nity to protect securities-sponsoring organizations from chal-
lenges to their acts and obligations in administering the arbi-
trations, including the arbitrator selection, disclosure of
conflicts of interests, violations of internal policies, and even
failure to provide notice to a party.8 0 The oft-cited case in this
area is Corey v. New York Stock Exchange, which ignored the
plaintiffs' claim that the NYSE employed improper arbitrator
selection procedures because, according to the court, the com-
mon law policy of arbitrator immunity protected the NYSE."'
The court offered three rationales: (1) that such "[e]xtension of
arbitral immunity to encompass boards which sponsor arbitra-
tion is a natural and necessary product of the policies underly-
ing arbitral immunity [for] otherwise the immunity extended to
arbitrators is illusionary," (2) that "[it would be of little value
to the whole arbitral procedure to merely shift the liability to
the sponsoring association," and (3) that "the federal Arbitra-
tion Act provides the exclusive remedy for challenging acts that
taint an arbitration award." 82
Likewise, Olson v. National Ass'n of Securities Dealers af-
firmed dismissal of a suit against the NASD for, inter alia,
breach of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation, gross negli-
gence, and negligent processing due to the arbitrator's ongoing
business relationship with the employer. 8 3 The court rejected
the plaintiffs argument that the selection of arbitrators occurs
before any decision making and therefore falls outside the
scope of arbitral immunity, concluding that the organization's
immunity protects all acts that are "a necessary part of arbitra-
tion administration."84 According to Olson, "[w]ithout this ex-
tension [of arbitrator immunity to sponsoring institutions], ar-
bitral immunity would be almost meaningless because liability
would simply be shifted from individual arbitrators to the
sponsoring institutions."'85
179. Id. at 692 ("The NASD's actions are more akin to those of the SEC,
which has sovereign immunity from damage suits .... [The NASD] requires
absolute immunity from civil liability for actions connected with the disciplin-
ing of its members." (citation omitted)).
180. See supra note 177; infra note 192.
181. 691 F.2d 1205 (6th Cir. 1982).
182. Id. at 1211.
183. 85 F.3d 382 (8th Cir. 1996).
184. Id. at 383.
185. Id.
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Austern v. Chicago Board Options Exchange, Inc. extended
absolute immunity from liability in damages to the options ex-
change (which administered the arbitration proceeding) despite
alleged violation of two of its own policies. These policies re-
quired that (1) the majority of the panel be composed of arbitra-
tors not from the securities industry, and (2) notice of time and
place for the hearing be given at least eight days prior. 87 In
fact, all the arbitrators were from the securities industry, and
the plaintiff (living in Israel) never received notice. 8 8 Although
recognizing that these tasks were administrative, the court
characterized them as "integrally related to the arbitral proc-
ess."' 8 Echoing Corey, the court stated that
[e]xtension of arbitral immunity to encompass boards that sponsor
arbitration is a natural and necessary product of the policies underly-
ing arbitral immunity; otherwise the immunity extended to arbitra-
tors is illusory. It would be of little value to the whole arbitral proce-
dure to merely shift the liability to the sponsoring association.'
9
0
The court also noted that "[r]educing the [Board's] immu-
nity based on the arbitral deficiencies present here would
merely serve to discourage its sponsorship of future arbitra-
tions."'' These assumptions have led numerous courts to follow
in the broad grant of immunity to securities arbitral institu-
tions. 1
92
186. 898 F.2d 882, 886 (2d Cir. 1990).
187. Id. at 884.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 886.
190. Id. (quoting Corey v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 691 F.2d 1205 (6th Cir. 1982)).
191. Id.
192. See Galuska v. N.Y. Stock Exch., No. 99-3522, 2000 WL 347851, at *2
(7th Cir. Apr. 3, 2000) (holding an arbitral organization immune from the
plaintiffs claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence,
and conspiracy); Honn v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 182 F.3d 1014, 1018
(8th Cir. 1999) (rejecting the claim that the arbitral organization's acts were
outside the scope of the NASD's arbitration sponsoring role, and concluding
that the challenged acts were "normal administrative functions" for which the
organization is entitled to immunity); Hawkins v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers,
Inc., 149 F.3d 330, 332 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that an arbitral organization
"is immune from civil liability arising from its actions taken in the course of
conducting arbitration proceedings"); Barbara v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 99
F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding that a sponsoring agency has absolute quasi-
judicial immunity for arbitration of member discipline); Yadav v. N.Y. Stock
Exch., Inc., 1992 WL 197409, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (concluding that the pro-
vider institution was immune to the plaintiffs claim relating to allegedly de-
fective notice because the act of providing such notice was "integrally related
to the arbitral process" (quoting Austern, 898 F.2d at 886)).
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3. The Wayward Expansion of Arbitral Immunity in
Contemporary Arbitration
Beginning in the 1990s, as the use of mandatory arbitra-
tion provisions began to proliferate in commercial and con-
sumer contracts, cases against providers of private arbitration
services emerged. In some of these cases, the courts upheld
immunity for the provider institution where the claim was
based on allegedly improper conduct by a labor arbitrator, thus
defeating an attempt to shift liability from an immune arbitra-
tor to the sponsoring organization.193 Most litigation has in-
volved claims against provider institutions for failing to abide
by policies involving the administration of an arbitration.
1 94
Perhaps resigned to seemingly impenetrable immunity, few re-
ported cases challenged an individual arbitrator's conduct.
Although providers often describe their role as purely ad-
ministrative, they routinely invoke the arbitral immunity de-
fense against any legal claims raised against them, and courts
have facilely equated provider institutions with arbitrators and
judges.195 Courts have broadly extended immunity to providers
based on acts not of the arbitrator, but of the providers' own
administrative responsibilities. For example, the court in New
England Cleaning Services, Inc. v. American Arbitration Ass'n
conferred immunity upon the AAA for a panoply of administra-
tive tasks, including determining jurisdiction, selecting arbitra-
tors, billing for services, and scheduling arbitrations, stating
that these are "integrally related to the arbitration."196 Contem-
porary cases summarily dismiss claims against arbitrators or
provider institutions on the grounds that (1) "[alll of the federal
courts of appeals that have considered this question" have ap-
plied arbitral immunity to "a suit designed to interfere with ar-
bitral jurisdiction,"197 (2) the parties to the arbitration agreed to
193. See, e.g., Richardson v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 888 F. Supp. 604
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (upholding the immunity of a sponsoring organization in an
action based on allegedly improper conduct by the labor arbitrator).
194. See supra Part II.C; infra note 196.
195. See supra note 192.
196. 199 F.3d 545, 546 (1st Cir. 1999). The court reasoned that "inter-
fer[ing] with the organization's neutrality and likely add[ing] further cost and
delay to the arbitral process," as well as "fail[ing] to extend immunity to the
AAA in these circumstances could discourage it from sponsoring future arbi-
trations... [and] would impede the implementation of federal policy favoring
arbitration." Id. at 546 (citations omitted).
197. Brandon, Jones, Sandall, Zeide, Kohn, Chalal & Musso, P.A. v. Med-
Partners, Inc., 203 F.R.D. 677, 688 & n.8 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (dissolving an in-
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abide by the organization's procedural rule "neither [it] nor any
arbitrator shall be liable to any party for any act or omission in
connection with any arbitration conducted under these rules,"98
and (3) there remained available alternative relief in the form
of judicial review to modify, vacate, or amend the arbitration
award.'99
Courts have held that provider institutions are immune
from liability for a variety of acts that strain credulity to regard
as anything but administrative or ministerial. For example, ar-
bitral immunity has insulated providers from liability for fail-
ing to send notice of a hearing, °° to inform a party of a dis-
closed conflict of interest between an arbitrator and opposing
party, ' or to abide by party instructions not to send out an
award pending settlement discussions. °2 The characterization
of administrative tasks as "integrally related to the arbitral
process" eviscerates any possible distinction between protected
and unprotected functions, expanding the doctrine well beyond
the judicial act limitation applied in cases involving public offi-
cials and judges.
Based on the foregoing precedent, the district court in Ja-
son v. American Arbitration Ass'n decided that arbitral immu-
nity attaches to "all acts within the scope of the arbitral proc-
ess."203 The court characterized the role of the AAA in the
arbitration process as that "of a court clerk," after the AAA ar-
gued that "arbitral immunity shields the arbitrators and the
association administering the arbitration.., from any liability
junction enjoining the arbitral organization from "conducting an improper ar-
bitration"), affd in part, appeal dismissed in part by 253 F.3d 709 (11th Cir.
2002); see also supra notes 177-96.
198. Med-Partners, 203 F.R.D. at 688 (quoting AAA Rules, R. 50(d)).
199. Id.
200. Austern v. Chi. Bd. Options Exch., 898 F.2d 882, 886 (2nd Cir. 1990).
201. Health Servs. Mgmt. Corp. v. Hughes, 975 F.2d 1253, 1260 n.6 (7th
Cir. 1992) (noting that the AAA "clearly violated" its own rule requiring its
disclosure of personal, financial, or professional relationships with either
party); see also L & H Airco, Inc. v. Rapistan Corp., 446 N.W.2d 372, 377
(Minn. 1989) (conferring immunity despite an arbitrator's failure to disclose
conflicts of interest).
202. Thiele v. RML Realty Partners, 14 Cal. App. 4th 1526, 1532 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1993) (construing an act of sending out an arbitral award allegedly con-
trary to express instructions not as "administrative," but rather "as much a
part of the arbitral process as is determining the award").
203. No. 02-474, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9645, at *6 (E.D. La. May 23, 2002)
(citing Galuska v. N.Y. Stock Exch., No. 99-3522, 2000 WL 347851, at *2 (7th
Cir. Apr. 3, 2000) (citations omitted)).
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for misconduct coming within the scope of the dispute resolu-
tion process."2 4 The court agreed with the AAA, summarily
dismissing the employee's claims against the AAA for negli-
gence and breach of contract in failing to properly and equita-
bly administer the arbitration proceeding against the em-
ployer.05
4. Who Has Not Been Afforded Arbitral Immunity
Due to the broad interpretation of all activities that relate
to the arbitration process as arbitral (or judicial acts), with
practically nothing accepted as merely administrative, the case
law is sparse in presenting situations in which immunity has
not been afforded. The limited examples are (1) complete non-
feasance, such as when the arbitrator renders no decision at
all,20 6 (2) where the arbitrator was considered an "agent" of a
party,0 7 and (3) where the acts complained of lie outside of the
204. Id. at *5, 8.
205. Id. at *8-9 (asserting that the FAA also "provides the exclusive rem-
edy for challenging misconduct in the administration of an arbitration
award"). Similarly, in International Medical Group, Inc. v. American Arbitra-
tion Ass'n, the court upheld the AAA's immunity from a suit based on wrongful
exercise of jurisdiction in part because the claim was "integrally related to the
administrative tasks of the AAA ... similar to the administrative tasks of a
court clerk accepting a complaint for filing." 312 F.3d 833, 844 (7th Cir. 2002).
The plaintiff, who was not a party to the arbitration agreement, was drawn
into arbitration and asked the court to recognize a new "bad-faith arbitration"
cause of action against arbitration providers. Id. at 837, 845. The court refused
and emphasized that if an arbitration provider makes an administrative mis-
take, the wronged party could find an appropriate remedy in court by seeking
injunctive relief against the party initiating the arbitration. Id. at 844.
206.. See E.C. Ernst, Inc. v. Manhattan Constr. Co. of Tex., 551 F.2d 1026,
1033 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that an arbitrator loses his claim to immunity
"[w]here his action, or inaction, can fairly be characterized as delay or failure
to decide rather than timely decisionmaking"); Baar v. Tigerman, 189 Cal.
Rptr. 834 (Ct. App. 1983) (refusing immunity to an arbitrator or a sponsoring
organization where after a four-year period that included forty-three days of
evidentiary hearings and ten days of closing arguments, the arbitrator failed
to report the decision within the AAA and statutory time limit). The court in
Baar v. Tigerman viewed arbitral immunity more critically, holding that al-
though arbitral immunity covered quasi-judicial actions, it did not extend to
protect the arbitrator from liability for failure to render an award and did not
protect the sponsoring organization where the arbitrator was not immune
from liability. 189 Cal. Rptr. at 836, 839.
207. See United States v. City of Hayward, 36 F.3d 832, 838 (9th Cir. 1994)
(concluding that the immunity doctrine for a neutral processing agency is in-
applicable to a municipality when the municipality appointed an arbitrator
pursuant to a local ordinance mandating arbitration).
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arbitrator's jurisdiction. 8
By this substantial precedent, the arbitral acts of arbitra-
tors and private nonprofit or for-profit provider institutions ap-
pear to be beyond the reach of the law.09
D. REINING IN THE DOCTRINE
The cases in which the arbitral immunity doctrine was de-
veloped predate the ubiquitous and modern practice of arbitra-
tion and arose primarily where arbitration was the exclusive
means of resolving disputes, and where arbitrators largely vol-
unteered out of a public service to their respective industry,
akin to jury service, on matters related to the specific industry
and not general law. Further, arbitration traditionally occurred
in industries regulated by federal law or oversight of a federal
regulatory agency. 20 These factors, along with the similarity of
the adjudicatory decision-making functions of judges and arbi-
trators, encouraged acceptance of immunity for arbitrators and,
later, for self-regulated sponsoring institutions. The doctrine
became so entrenched, however, that courts seemed to cloak all
acts of an arbitrator or provider with immunity without critical
analysis. This wayward expansion of immunity has not been
208. See Kemner v. Dist. Council of Painting & Allied Trades No. 386, 768
F.2d 1115, 1119-20 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that the defendants are not im-
mune from suit as to the plaintiff's claims for relief for acts allegedly taken in
excess of the committees' jurisdiction).
209. States have largely followed the immunity coverage in the federal
cases. See, e.g., Alexander v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, No. C 01-1461 PJH, 2001
WL 868823, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2001) (concluding that "[a]rbitration
associations are granted absolute immunity for a broad category of acts per-
formed during the course of an arbitration proceeding," and then granting ar-
bitral immunity despite alleged violation of internal policy, which the court
held falls within the scope of the arbitration process because the policy dic-
tates how arbitration proceeds); Cort v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n., 795 F. Supp.
970, 972-73 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (dismissing the plaintiffs claim that the selection
of arbitrators constituted an administrative decision rather than a judicial
act); Am. Arbitration Ass'n. v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 899 (App. Dep't
Super. Ct. 1992) (extending statutory-based arbitral immunity to a sponsoring
organization for an alleged procedural error).
210. See Van Wezel Stone, supra note 1, at 996-1012 (describing the use of
arbitration in the securities industry and labor-management relations). Van
Wezel Stone notes that
both the NLRA and the Securities Exchange Act were enacted in the
1930s, and both rely on governmental agencies for their implementa-
tion. In each case, the agency has delegated its authority to pre-
existing private organizations that have long had internal governance
structures, including private dispute resolution mechanisms.
Id. at 1008.
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faithful to the careful distinctions made in judicial immunity
jurisprudence or to the Supreme Court's admonition that im-
munity be granted sparingly.211
Recent cases rarely provide any justification for extending
immunity to providers other than the established rule or man-
212tra that arbitrators and providers are simply immune. Yet, as
the court in Ernst identified:
The arbitrator's "quasi-judicial" immunity arises from his resem-
blance to a judge. The scope of his immunity should be no broader
than this resemblance. The arbitrator serves as a private vehicle for
the ordering of economic relationships. He is a creature of contract,
paid by the parties to perform a duty, and his decision binds the par-
ties because they make a specific, private decision to be bound. His
decision is not socially momentous except to those who pay him to de-
cide. The judge, however, is an official governmental instrumentality
for resolving societal disputes. The parties submit their disputes to
him through the structure of the judicial system, at mostly public ex-
pense. His decisions may be glossed with public policy considerations
and fraught with the consequences of stare decisis. When in discharg-
ing his function the arbitrator resembles a judge, we protect the in-
tegrity of his decisionmaking by guarding against his fear of being
mulcted in damages. But he should be immune from liability only to
the extent that his action is functionally judge-like. Otherwise we be-
come mesmerized by words.
21 3
III. ABSOLUTE ARBITRAL IMMUNITY: DOES IT MAKE
SENSE FOR COMMERCIALIZED ARBITRATION?
A. EXAMINING THE ANALOGY OR FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENCE
211. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988) (denying absolute immu-
nity to a state court judge based on the judge's decision to demote and dismiss
a probation officer). Although judicial immunity jurisprudence criticized the
broad scope of judicial immunity, the justification for broad protection of pri-
vate arbitral actors is more problematic. See Pillai, supra note 124, at 99 (urg-
ing that the judiciary limit absolute judicial immunity to a narrow class of ju-
dicial acts within the judiciary and not extend it to other officials outside the
judiciary).
212. See supra Part II.C.
213. E.C. Ernst, Inc. v. Manhattan Constr. Co. of Tex., 551 F.2d 1026, 1033
(5th Cir. 1977) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The court also noted:
In his role as interpreter of the contract and as private decision-
maker, the arbitrator has a duty, express or implied, to make rea-
sonably expeditious decisions. Where his action, or inaction, can fairly
be characterized as delay or failure to decide rather than timely deci-
sionmaking (good or bad), he loses his claim to immunity because he
loses his resemblance to a judge. He has simply defaulted on a con-
tractual duty to both parties.
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BETWEEN PUBLIC JUDGING AND CONTEMPORARY ARBITRATION
PRACTICE
Given the increasingly commercialized nature of the pri-
vate arbitration industry, broad extension of the judicial im-
munity doctrine to arbitrators and provider institutions re-
quires a critical reexamination. The analogy to judicial
immunity ("the judicial analogy") is increasingly unsuitable,
and significant differences warrant distinct treatment for arbi-
tral immunity.
21 4
1. Unqualified Arbitral Immunity Fails the Butz Test
Courts have extended immunity to public officials in lim-
ited situations that comport with the three prongs of Butz v.
Economou.215 When applied to private arbitrators and provider
institutions in contemporary arbitration practice, crucial as-
pects of these factors are lacking. For example, notably absent
from the cases establishing arbitral immunity is discussion of
the procedural safeguards prong of Butz. Arbitral awards are
final, subject to a restricted remedy of vacatur, where the of-
fending conduct of the arbitrator goes unpenalized and the ag-S1216
grieved party uncompensated. Even upon obtaining vacatur,
the party is bound to return to the private arbitration system,
with its lack of guarantees of fair process.
The judicial analogy is also weakened by the fact that the
Supreme Court has only extended immunity to individuals in a
public setting, and that fundamental differences exist between
a public judge in an adjudicatory process and the private arbi-
214. Rather, given the significant differences between publicly paid judges
and private arbitrators who charge a market rate, a professional services
analogy for arbitrators is more apt.
215. 438 U.S. 478, 508-17 (1978); see supra text accompanying note 143.
216. Although the FAA permits vacatur of an arbitration award based on
an arbitrator's bias, fraud, or misconduct, the law does nothing to compensate
the aggrieved party for the lost time, arbitration costs, or fees incurred in chal-
lenging the award. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000) (stating permissible grounds for
vacating an arbitration award); see also Rubenstein v. Otterbourg, 357
N.Y.S.2d 52, 62 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1973) (denying the plaintiffs claim to recover
legal fees incurred as a result of a successful challenge that vacated a unani-
mous arbitration award due to arbitrator bias and the arbitration association's
failure to intervene or remove a biased arbitrator); Kenneth R. Davis, When
Ignorance of the Law Is No Excuse: Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 45
BUFF. L. REV. 49, 60 (1997) ('Judicial review of arbitration awards is far nar-
rower than the scope of review of trial court judgments .... Most errors of fact
or law are not reviewable.").
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tration industry.217 Moreover, cases extending immunity to ar-
bitrators typically rest on authority and arbitration use that
predate the now ubiquitous use of predispute mandatory arbi-
tration cases and the proliferation of an industry of numerous
private arbitration provider institutions and professional pri-
vate arbitrators, many of whom market their services as pro-
fessional neutrals and charge substantial fees. That the private
arbitration industry should enjoy the same absolute immunity
afforded public judges, and be exempt from accountability re-
quired by other professionals or industries, is increasingly du-
bious.18
For example, arbitrators perform professional services un-
der contract for which they are highly compensated (in contrast
to judges, who are paid public-servant salaries). Unlike judges,
they are in a position to purchase malpractice insurance. Ar-
guably, the market for malpractice insurance could somewhat
efficiently signal the competence of individual arbitrators and
arbitration providers and shift costs more efficiently among the
contracting parties. An immunity rule takes the market out of
the picture, and is better suited to government functions than
private contractual arrangements.
2. Public and Private Adjudication Proceedings Are
Significantly Different
Despite a strong public policy favoring arbitration, the sig-
nificant differences between private arbitration and public ad-
judication cannot be ignored. 219 The important differences be-
217. See Butz, 438 U.S. at 512.
218. The same policy considerations supporting immunity for arbitrators
and provider institutions-to ward off lawsuits-can be true for all professions
where difficult judgments must be made, including doctors, lawyers, plumbers,
and accountants. But does the recent Enron and Arthur Andersen controversy
instruct us to shield independent auditors from scrutiny? The analogy to audi-
tors is particularly apt: Auditors perform a quasi-judicial function in rendering
a decision regarding whether a company's books fairly state their financial
condition under appropriate SEC rules. See supra Part I.B.1 (discussing the
regulation of professions).
219. The Supreme Court acknowledged these significant differences be-
tween arbitration and public adjudication in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of
America:
The nature of the tribunal where suits are tried is an important part
of the parcel of rights behind a cause of action. The change from a
court of law to an arbitration panel may make a radical difference in
ultimate result. Arbitration carries no right to trial by jury that is
guaranteed both by the Seventh Amendment and [the state constitu-
tion]. Arbitrators do not have the benefit of judicial instruction on the
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tween public and private judges necessitate a narrower scope of
immunity for arbitral providers. As the California Supreme
Court acknowledged,
superior court judges are accountable to the public in ways arbitra-
tors are not. Superior court judges are [state] constitutional officers
who are sworn to uphold the United States and California Constitu-
tions. They are locally elected and may be recalled. They are subject to
discipline by a public body, the Commission on Judicial Performance.
Virtually all of their proceedings take place in public view. Their deci-
sions are subject to appellate review. By contrast, arbitrators are not
public officers and are in no way publicly accountable. Their proceed-
ings take place in private. They are subject to minimal appellate re-
view. There can be little doubt that publicly accountable judges,
rather than arbitrators, are the most appropriate overseers of injunc-
tive remedies explicitly designed for public protection.m
The court in Baar v. Tigerman raised similar concerns in
noting fundamental differences between judicial proceedings
and arbitrations:
[Jiudges derive their power from the Constitution and the people
while arbitrators derive their power from private contracts; judicial
action has far-reaching and precedential consequences whereas arbi-
trators do not create and are not bound by precedent; an independent
judiciary is essential to the preservation of democracy whereas arbi-
tration plays a less noble role; trials are public whereas arbitration is
private; and judges must follow the law while arbitrators may disre-
gard it.
221
In fact, arbitration providers are less accountable than
judges or immune public officials. Arbitration providers, which
by their own definition simply administer and do not decide
law; they need not give their reasons for their results; the record of
their proceedings is not as complete as it is in a court trial; and judi-
cial review of an award is more limited than judicial review of a
trial ....
350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956). In that case the Court ruled the FAA did not apply to
the discharged employee's claim because the transaction did not involve inter-
state commerce. Id. at 200-02. The Court, regarding the FAA as "substantive"
law, noted, "If the federal court allows arbitration where the state court would
disallow it, the outcome of litigation might depend on the courthouse where
suit is brought. For the remedy by arbitration, whatever its merits or short-
comings, substantially affects the cause of action created by the State." Id. at
203.
220. Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans of Cal., 988 P.2d 67, 77-78 (Cal.
1999) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
221. Sponseller, supra note 63, at 429 (citing Baar v. Tigerman, 189 Cal.
Rptr. 834, 837-38 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983)). In Baar, the court refused to grant
immunity to an arbitrator who breached his contract to render a timely award,
and reasoned that "arbitration remains essentially a private contractual ar-
rangement between parties." Baar v. Tigerman, 189 Cal. Rptr. 834, 838 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1983).
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cases, receive a wide scope of immunity by extension to publicly
accountable entities. 2 Unlike public officials, private arbitra-
tors are not susceptible to injunctive relief in § 1983 civil rights
litigation because of their private actor status. Furthermore,
unlike judges, arbitrators are not subject to the political process
for removal, retention, or election, or to procedures for punish-
ing judicial misconduct. Whereas judges are subject to signifi-
cant scrutiny and free press, the lack of a public record of arbi-
tral decisions insulates private arbitrators from any public
scrutiny.
The judicial act limitation has been discarded and replaced
with a presumption that all acts related to an arbitration, in-
cluding administrative acts, are "integrally related" to the arbi-
tral process, and thus immune.22 Even if arbitrators or provid-
ers are in some ways comparable to the public judges and court
clerks, that does not mean they are identical."' Even court
clerks are not entitled to absolute immunity for administrative
or ministerial acts. 25 Summarily regarding private arbitration
businesses, from the local pop-up provider to the large national
and multinational arbitration companies, as court clerks ig-
nores reality and the need to protect the public from abuse.
3. The Assumptions Motivating Arbitral Immunity Are
Outdated
The stated policy justifications for broad arbitral immunity
do not require the industry's wholesale exemption from the law.
222. See AAA, COMM. ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 18 at R. 2.
223. New England Cleaning Servs., Inc. v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 199 F.3d
542, 545 (1st Cir. 1999).
224. See Feingberg v. Katz, No. 01 Civ. 2739, 2003 LEXIS 1677, at *19
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2003) ("The tendency to analogize arbitration to trial, and
arbitrator to judge, should thus be avoided.").
225. See, e.g., Geitz v. Overall, 62 Fed. Appx. 744, 746 (8th Cir. 2003) (hold-
ing court clerks absolutely immune only for discretionary acts or acts taken at
the direction of a judge or court order, but not for a claim based on charges
that the clerks intentionally failed to perform ministerial acts); X v. Casey, No.
90-667, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 1488, at *5 (4th Cir. Feb. 4, 1991) (rejecting ab-
solute immunity for a court clerk's ministerial duties but finding a court
clerk's negligence in filing actionable); McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1, 4 (4th
Cir. 1972) (rejecting absolute immunity for a court clerk's ministerial duties
but finding a court clerk's negligence in filing actionable); see also Claire E.
Harkrider, Note, An Act-Based Analysis of Immunity and Its Application to
Unconstitutional Acts of Court Clerks, 76 MINN. L. REv. 1393, 1419-20 (1992)
(concluding that court clerk immunity should be limited to discretionary acts
or acts done pursuant to a court order, but not to ministerial acts).
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First, the policy favoring arbitration should also support favor-
ing integrity in arbitration. Second, the claim that arbitrators
and providers will not serve without immunity is hardly realis-
tic given the growing market, hourly rates, and economic incen-
tives of private arbitration practice. Compliance with the law
should be a cost of doing business. Other professionals, such as
lawyers and doctors, also run the risk of being sued by disgrun-
tled clients or patients, and generally carry liability insurance.
It is doubtful that the private arbitration industry will go away
if arbitrators, like other professionals, are responsible for their
contracts and nonjudicial acts. Third, the claim that private
provider institutions are like court clerks can be questioned, at
a minimum, by comparing the costs charged by the two entities
for case administration. Even if a private individual or institu-
tion performs tasks comparable to a public official, that does
not itself mean that the same level of immunity should apply to
both public and private actors. Should private security guards,
for example, have the same immunity as police officers?
226
There are significant differences between public and private ad-
judication. The private industry should not be less accountable
than public officials.
Another contention in support of immunity is that the FAA
vacatur provisions are the exclusive remedy for arbitral mis-
conduct .2 " The statute provides that arbitral awards may be
vacated, inter alia, on the grounds of evident partiality in the
arbitrators or misconduct that prejudiced the rights of the par-
ties.228 The FAA does not express any grant of immunity for the
226. Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 407-12 (1997) (denying immu-
nity to private prison guards on the grounds that the policy goals that had led
the Court to imply immunity in other contexts would not be vindicated by do-
ing so in this one).
227. See Corey v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 691 F.2d 1205, 1211-12 (6th Cir. 1982);
Prudential Secs., Inc. v. Hornsby, 865 F. Supp. 447, 450-52 (N.D. Ill. 1994)
(holding that the FAA's provision is the exclusive avenue for reopening arbi-
tration decisions and considering motions to vacate).
228. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000). The statute provides that a court may vacate an
award
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means.
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitra-
tors, or either of them.
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to
hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any
other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been preju-
diced.
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underlying conduct. Although the statute is silent on whether
its vacatur provisions are the exclusive means for vacatur,
some authorities consider the FAA exclusive, while others dis-
agree. 2 The FAA's process for vacatur of an award on the basis
of arbitral misconduct does not necessarily foreclose independ-
ent actions. In public adjudication, the fact that court proce-
dural rules permit a court to set aside a judgment where a
party engaged in fraud, misrepresentation, or other miscon-
duct, does not preclude independent sanction and recourse
against the illegal conduct or abuse of process.2 30 Arbitration
should be no different.
Finally, immunity is considered to support the finality of
arbitral awards. Recognizing that provider institutions may be
subject to independent claims does not attack the finality of the
award itself. Where, for example, an award has been vacated
on the grounds of arbitral misconduct, such misconduct should
not necessarily escape independent accountability. Thus, the
finality of the award itself is subject to the statutory vacatur
process to challenge the awards based on arbitral misconduct,
but the misconduct need not go unredressed.
The policy favoring arbitration rests upon the belief that
contracts to settle disputes by arbitration should be "on the
same footing" as other contracts and thus respected and en-
forced.23' Recourse should be available when an arbitrator or
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the sub-
ject matter submitted was not made.
Id.
229. Sabin, supra note 8, at 1349-50. Sabin notes:
Many federal circuits recognize several nonstatutory grounds for va-
catur. These include awards in "manifest disregard of the law," in
conflict with "public policy," "arbitrary and capricious," "completely
irrational," or contrary to the "essence" of the arbitration agreement.
Yet, the value of nonstatutory vacatur is illusory because arbitrators
are not required to issue a formal opinion.... [Elven when recognized
as a ground for vacatur, "the absence of substantive reasoned awards
revealing the manner in which arbitrators have decided the cases be-
fore them has been a major factor in effectively insulating challenged
arbitration awards from vacatur on the basis of nonstatutory grounds.
Hence, nonstatutory vacatur is "virtually precluded."
Id. (citations omitted). Thus, judicial review is not an effective means of over-
seeing arbitrators. Id.; see also Stephen L. Hayford, A New Paradigm for
Commercial Arbitration: Rethinking the Relationship Between Reasoned
Awards and the Judicial Standards for Vacatur, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 443,
464-65 (1998).
230. See FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
231. See supra note 47; see also supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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provider breaches such a contractual obligation, engages in tor-
tious conduct, or violates statutory laws. The reverence for con-
tract should apply equally to require accountability in arbitra-
tion.
4. Arbitrator Ethical Guidelines Need Enforcement Remedies
Substantial efforts by concerned leaders in the arbitration
industry have led to the development of various arbitration due
process protocols, in addition to codes of ethics for arbitrators
and provider organizations.232 These are invaluable in articulat-
ing good practice standards. Nevertheless, such standards
largely fail to provide a means of enforcement or remedy to an
aggrieved party. 3 Interestingly, when the state of California
acted to mandate a code of arbitrator ethics, many arbitrators
and providers, who apparently subscribed to such ethical stan-
dards, opposed the legislation.234
A broad application of arbitral immunity to shield account-
ability for nondecisional acts and violations of these standards
or general principles of law does not accord with the traditional
justification for judicial immunity and public policy regulating
professions. The need exists for both courts and legislatures to
examine critically the application of arbitral immunity. The
contours and application of arbitral immunity must be defined
so as to provide meaningful redress for arbitral failures.
B. RESPECTING THE DOCTRINE'S LIMITS ACCOMMODATES THE
NEED FOR ARBITRATOR INDEPENDENCE AND FINAL DECISIONS
YET DEMANDS ACCOUNTABILITY FOR INDEPENDENT ILLEGAL
ACTS
1. Abide by the Judicial Act and Jurisdictional Limitations
Immunity for public judges is provided only for judicial
acts within the court's jurisdiction. Administrative or legisla-
tive acts, even though performed by a judge, are not immune.
The cases extending broad immunity to arbitration providers
rarely analyze this distinction, and in effect redefine judicial
232. See supra notes 30-32.
233. See supra Part I.B.2.
234. See Jay Folberg, Arbitration Ethics-Is California the Future?, 18
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 343, 352-55 (2003) (describing various opposition
to arbitrator ethics standards); Caroline E. Mayer, Arbitration Standards
Challenged, WASH. POST, July 30, 2002, at El (noting opposition by the secu-
rities industry to new arbitration ethics standards and disclosure rules).
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acts to include any tasks that are "integrally related to the ar-
bitration."23 This characterization sweeps too broadly and
eliminates any distinction between administrative and judicial
acts, contrary to the narrow interpretation urged by the Su-
preme Court. 3 6 Limiting arbitral immunity within the tradi-
tional confines adequately protects concerns for independence,
finality of arbitral decisions, and efforts to shift liability.
Arbitral provider institutions, by their own proclamation,
only administer arbitration cases and retain arbitrators as in-
dependent contractors.237 Parties who arbitrate under a pro-
vider institution contract generally have the institution admin-
ister the arbitration in accordance with the provider's rules and
procedures. These rules set forth the provider's obligation to
manage virtually every aspect of the arbitration, from the filing
of a case to final disposition, including providing the parties
with a list of potential arbitrators, notice of filings and hear-
ings, and information regarding arbitrator disclosures that per-
235. New England Cleaning Servs. v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 199 F.3d 542,
545 (1st Cir. 1999); see also Olson v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 85 F.3d 381,
382-83 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that "[a] sponsoring organization is immune
from civil liability for improperly selecting an arbitration panel, even when the
selection violates the organization's own rules," and affirming dismissal of
plaintiffs suit against NASD for, inter alia, breach of contract, fraudulent
misrepresentation, gross negligence, and negligent processing of arbitration
due to arbitrator's ongoing business relationship with employer, on grounds
that the NASD's appointment of the arbitrator was within the scope of the ar-
bitral process protected under the doctrine of arbitral immunity); Austern v.
Chi. Bd. Options Exch., Inc., 898 F.2d 882, 886-87 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that
'arbitrators in contractually agreed upon arbitration proceedings are abso-
lutely immune from liability in damages for all acts within the scope of the ar-
bitral process," and that the options exchange, in sponsoring and administer-
ing arbitration proceedings, was immune from suit for alleged failure to follow
its own policies regarding panel composition and notice of proceeding); Corey
v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 691 F.2d 1205, 1211 (6th Cir. 1982) (holding that the
plaintiffs claims against the NYSE for improper arbitrator selection proce-
dures were barred by the common law policy of arbitrator immunity because
such "[e]xtension of arbitral immunity to encompass boards which sponsor ar-
bitration is a natural and necessary product of the policies underlying arbitral
immunity; otherwise the immunity extended to arbitrators is illusory").
236. See supra Part II.B.
237. See AM. ARBITRATION Ass'N, STATEMENT OF ETHICAL PRINCIPLES,
http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid+15718&JSPsrc=upload\LIVESITE \
Rules Procedures\EthicsStandards\principals.html (last visited Oct. 12,
2003). The AAA Web site advertises, "The AAA administers cases. It does not
determine the merits of a case: arbitrators decide cases. AAA staff members do
not hear evidence, do not write awards, and do not review the reasoning of
awards. AAA awards are only reviewed to ensure proper format. Arbitrators
and mediators at the AAA are independent." Id.
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tain to potential conflicts of interest."8 The provider institu-
tion's filing and administrative fees for its services are gener-
ally separate from the arbitrator's fee.239
- Although the courts have not articulated a precise defini-
tion of judicial act, in essence the function to be protected is the
decisional act and exercise of discretionary judgment based on
the evidence presented in an adversarial proceeding. 4° Under
this definition some, but not all, actions of provider institutions
may fairly be considered judicial acts. For example, in Interna-
tional Medical Group, Inc. v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 41 the
AAA had to exercise discretion in determining that a party had
satisfied the filing requirements and thus proceed with admin-
istering an arbitration despite an opposing party's objection.242
Other administrative tasks by a provider, however, do not re-
quire such discretion. Thus, failing to send notice to a party or
to report a conflict disclosure, sending out an award contrary to
the parties' instructions, misrepresenting the nature of the ar-
bitral services, failing to follow internal rules or contractual
representations, violating statutory laws prohibiting discrimi-
nation, conspiracy or consumer deception, or engaging in acts
that do not involve discretionary decisions based on a presenta-
tion of evidence are not judicial acts and should not be im-
mune. 243 The jurisdictional limitation also restricts arbitral
238. See, e.g., AAA, COMM. ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 18.
239. See id. at R. 49; see also NAT'L ARBITRATION FORUM, SCHEDULE OF
FEES, supra note 20 (setting forth administrative fees for, inter alia, filing,
hearings, processing, suspension for nonpayment, and hearing room rental).
240. See Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 435-36 (1993)
(holding that the key to the extension of judicial immunity to nonjudicial offi-
cials is the "performance of the function of resolving disputes between parties,
or of authoritatively adjudicating private rights"); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. 409, 422-23 n.20 (1976) ("It is the functional comparability of their judg-
ments to those of the judge that has resulted in both grand jurors and prosecu-
tors being referred to as 'quasi-judicial' officers, and their immunities being
termed 'quasi-judicial' as well."). Even absolute judicial immunity has been
restricted to exclude ministerial acts. See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S 339, 348-
49 (1879).
241. 312 F.3d 833 (1st Cir. 2002).
242. Id. at 844. The court analogized these discretionary administrative
tasks to those of a court clerk who receives a filing that complies with the
court's rules; precedent supports granting immunity in such situations. Id. at
843. The court went on to state, however, that if an arbitration provider or-
ganization does make an administrative mistake, the wronged party is not
without relief. The appropriate remedy "would be for the wronged party to
seek injunctive relief against the party initiating the arbitration in an appro-
priate court." Id. at 844.
243. Compare New England Cleaning Servs. Inc., v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n,
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immunity. Jurisdiction for arbitrators and providers is derived
from the authority granted by the parties in the appointing
contract. Where arbitrator providers engage in misconduct that
exceeds their jurisdictional authority, immunity is unwar-
ranted. Finally, attempts to escape responsibility for these fail-
ures or other statutory violations by contractual disclaimer
should be considered void as contrary to public policy.2"
2. Reframe the Analysis: Identifying the Claim and Real Party
in Interest Avoids Disrupting Award Finality and Attempts to
Shift Liability
Immunity has been granted to arbitrators and providers
without an analysis of whether claims arise out of decisional
acts, administrative acts, or independent obligations. Where
the claims relate to the latter two categories that do not involve
• • 241
discretionary or deliberative acts, immunity is misplaced.
The better analysis is not to press the fiction that the pri-
vate arbitration industry, particularly with respect to arbitra-
tions between corporate parties and individual consumers and
employees, is equivalent to the public justice system, or that
corporate provider institutions are "like court clerks."246 The
policy justifications for conferring immunity can be assuaged by
reframing the question, not as to whether the arbitral actors
are per se immune, but rather by identifying, as to the particu-
199 F.3d 542, 545 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that immunity extends to adminis-
trative tasks performed by an arbitration association that are "integrally re-
lated to the arbitration," even if the provider fails to follow its own internal
procedural rules), and Olson v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 85 F.3d 381, 382
(8th Cir. 1996) (holding an arbitration organization immune from civil liability
for improperly selecting an arbitration panel, even though the selection vio-
lated the organization's own rules), and Thiele v. RML Realty Partners, 14
Cal. App. 4th 1526, 1528-32 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (finding an arbitration asso-
ciation immune from liability for sending out an arbitrator's award contrary to
the party's instructions), with Holding, supra note 67 (discussing a proposed
bill in the California Assembly that would eliminate arbitration firms' immu-
nity from lawsuits and allow arbitration parties to sue for misconduct).
244. See supra notes 35, 73 and accompanying text.
245. See supra note 225.
246. Int'l Med. Group, 312 F.3d at 841-45 (refusing to recognize a new
"bad-faith arbitration" cause of action against arbitration providers for acting
in the absence of jurisdiction after the plaintiff was drawn into an arbitration).
The plaintiff, who was not a party to the arbitration agreements, brought suit
alleging that the arbitration provider (the AAA) engaged in tortious conduct
by asserting jurisdiction over the plaintiff when the AAA proceeded with an
insurance claimant's demand for arbitration naming the plaintiff company as
a respondent. Id. at 837-41.
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lar claim presented: Who is the real party in interest?247 Courts
and legislators should distinguish claims that challenge a judi-
cial act or attempt to shift liability to the provider from claims
that seek to enforce a contractual obligation or independent
standard of law. If a claim against a provider is really a dis-
guised complaint against the arbitrator's decisional acts or a
form of vicarious liability, the provider simply is not the real
party in interest-immunity is irrelevant .248 However, where it
is alleged that an arbitrator or provider has violated an inde-
pendent obligation based on their agreed-upon contractual du-
ties or laws of general application, broad immunity is unwar-
ranted.
3. Recognize Viability of Independent Claims
The Seventh Circuit in Caudle v. American Arbitration
Ass'n recognized that in these "shifting the blame" situations,
the correct analysis is to identify that the "arbitrators and or-
ganizing bodies are not the real parties in interest" to the dis-
pute.4 9 In Caudle, the Seventh Circuit correctly acknowledged
that provider institutions should not be responsible for acts
that would fall within an arbitrator's realm of immunity; how-
ever, it acknowledged that claims against providers or even ar-
bitrators that are independent of the decisional function shouldnot be "250
not be summarily foreclosed.
Likewise, the plaintiffs in Garcia v. Wayne Homes, LLC
251
asserted claims against the AAA challenging (1) the propriety
of the AAA's exclusive contracts with the defendant under the
federal and state antitrust laws, and (2) the truthfulness in the
AAA's marketing and sales practices under the consumer pro-
247. FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a).
248. Thus, where a party has challenged the merits of an adjudicatory de-
cision, or when a claim against a provider is really a disguised complaint
against the arbitrator's decision (shifting liability), the provider is not the real
party in interest and the claim should be dismissed.
249. 230 F.3d 920, 922 (7th Cir. 2000).
250. Id. The district court concluded that the organization was immune
from the plaintiffs breach of contract claim due to unreasonably high fees for
an arbitration. Id. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the claim for lack of jurisdic-
tion and hinted that a contract claim may have been tenable, for example, "if
Caudle had paid the entire amount requested by the AAA to conduct the arbi-
tration and the AAA had then pocketed the money without arbitrating the
dispute." Id. The court noted "it is unlikely that the AAA could claim 'immu-
nity' in response to a demand for a refund." Id.
251. CA. Case No. 2001 CA 53, 2002 LEXIS 1917, at *1 (Ohio. Ct. App.
Apr. 19, 2002).
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tection and civil conspiracy laws.252 In response, the AAA ar-
gued it was immune under arbitral immunity, and that it was
253not a real party in interest to the contract.
The court recognized the need for arbitrators to be "im-
mune from suits for acts performed within their capacity as ar-
bitrators and performed within their assigned duties and
authority,"254 yet identified a key distinction:
Where, however, a claim is presented asserting an independent cause
of action against an arbitral body, one contending that the body has
liability that is distinct from that of the parties to the arbitration pro-
ceeding and falls outside of the scope of recognized immunities, the
arbitral body is a real party in interest.
215
Although the court found that the claims against the AAA
were premature, it recognized the possibility that independent
claims survive immunity.
256
In Olson v. American Arbitration Ass'n, a lack of sufficient
supporting evidence, as opposed to carte blanche immunity,
252. Id. at *53-56. Specifically, the plaintiffs asserted that the arbitration
agreement forced them to purchase services from the AAA and was, therefore,
an illegal tying arrangement in violation of federal and state antitrust laws.
Id. at * 53. In addition, the plaintiffs
alleged that the AAA committed unfair and/or deceptive acts or prac-
tices by making general misrepresentations to the public regarding
the nature of the arbitration services it provides to consumers, i.e.,
that they conform with Consumer Due Process Protocol adopted by
the National Consumer Disputes Advisory Committee. The Appel-
lants also claimed that the AAA falsely represented that its arbitra-
tion services are, and would be, fair and equitable.
Id. at *55-56.
253. Id. at *56.
254. Id. at *62.
255. Id. at *58.
256. Id. at *64-66. The court noted:
They claim that AAA falsely represented to the general public that its
processes for consumer arbitration procedures are fair and equitable,
and that these procedures comply with the Consumer Due Process
Protocol .... Until the services are performed, however, it is prema-
ture to determine whether they are fair and equitable, or whether
they are performed in accordance with particular standards or repre-
sentations. In other words, AAA may yet perform the services as ad-
vertized .... Whether any claim based upon AAA's failure to perform
arbitration services as advertised can survive arbitral immunity is an
interesting issue, but one that we decline to decide in a vacuum. Once
AAA has arbitrated the dispute, if the Appellants conclude that they
are aggrieved under the Consumer Sales Practices or Deceptive Trade
Practices acts, they can bring an action under either or both acts, and
the issue of whether their claims are barred by arbitral immunity can
be litigated ....
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was the basis for the court's dismissal of the plaintiffs claims
against the AAA for violating the Texas Deceptive Trade Prac-
tices Act.257 The plaintiff claimed that the AAA misrepresented
its services by telling the public that it provides impartial arbi-
tration services through neutral, nonbiased arbitrators.58 The
plaintiff claimed that the AAA's process for choosing panels re-
sulted in arbitration panels biased in favor of employers be-
cause of five factors:
(1) the panels are stacked with lawyers who primarily represent em-
ployers in employment disputes; (2) a vast majority of the panelists
are men; (3) a vast majority of the panelists are white; (4) a vast ma-
jority of the panels are comprised of lawyers who do not represent a
cross-section of society; and (5) the AAA receives substantial contribu-
tions from employers. 59
The court recognized, over the AAA's claim of immunity,
that the alleged actions were independent of the decisional as-
pects of the arbitration.26 °
IV. PRESCRIBING THE CONTOURS OF ARBITRAL
IMMUNITY AND OPTIONS FOR ARBITRAL
ACCOUNTABILITY
A. CLARIFYING ITS SCOPE
1. The Need for a Balanced Standard
Holding any individual or entity immune from its acts is
contrary to the established maxim that no one is above the
law. 2 1 The Supreme Court has urged caution even with judicial
257. 876 F. Supp. 850, 851-52 (N.D. Tex. 1995).
258. Id. at 851.
259. Id. at 852 ("Accepting these allegations as true, these allegations do
not as a matter of law show bias. Olson speculates on stereotypical character-
istics that the arbitration panel in this case is biased. Olson's conclusion that
the panel is biased is unsupported by her remaining allegations in her com-
plaint.")
260. See id.
261. See Austin Mun. Sec., Inc. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 757 F.2d
676, 687 (5th Cir. 1985). The court noted:
Our judicial system assumes that all individuals, whatever their offi-
cial position, are subject to law.
"No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No of-
ficer of the law may set that law of defiance with impunity. All the of-
ficers of the government from the highest to the lowest, are creatures
of the law, and are bound to obey it."
Qualified immunity reconciles these conflicting factors by subject-
508
2004] REEXAMINING ARBITRAL IMMUNITY
immunity, stating that "[a]bsolute immunity.., is 'strong
medicine, justified only when the danger of [officials being] de-
flect[ed from the effective performance of their duties] is very
great."'262 Conferring immunity on a private actor or entity
gives, at a minimum, the appearance that those under its cloak
are accountable to neither the parties involved nor the public.
The assumption that providing absolute immunity to private
arbitrators and arbitration provider institutions is in the public
interest requires reassessment. This is particularly because
both arbitrators and providers are effectively unaccountable to
the public and parties, yet wield substantial power to impact
the disposition of legal disputes.
The intent underlying judicial and arbitral immunity is to
protect the decision-making function. For acts relating to deci-
sional authority, immunity for arbitrators is appropriate, but
this immunity must be accompanied by explicit standards de-
termining the scope of its application. Existing limits on immu-
nity and judicial procedural standards for challenging arbitral
decisions suffice to ensure a dissatisfied party is not simply at-
tempting a retrial on the merits.262 There are, however, signifi-
cant differences between private arbitration and public adjudi-
cation, notably the disparity in procedural safeguards, that
counsel for a cautious application of immunity.
2. Qualified Immunity More Appropriately Balances Concerns
for Finality and Accountability
Immunity may be appropriate where an arbitral institu-
tion is sued simply as a surrogate for the arbitrator's decision-
making acts. However, when arbitral providers are alleged to
have violated their own internal rules, failed to fulfill their con-
ing an official to liability only when he has intentionally violated a
person's constitutional rights.
Id. (quoting United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882)).
262. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 230 (1988) (quoting Forrester v.
White, 792 F.2d 647, 660 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J., dissenting)).
263. See, e.g., United States v. City of Hayward, 36 F.3d 832, 838 (9th Cir.
1994) (refusing to extend arbitrator immunity to the city, a party-appointed
arbitrator in an arbitration required by the city, where the arbitrator was
deemed an "agent" of the city); E.C. Ernst, Inc. v. Manhattan Constr. Co. of
Tex., 551 F.2d 1026, 1033 (5th Cir. 1977) (rejecting immunity for architects
serving as arbitrators when the alleged wrongdoing was the failure to render
decisions, as opposed to an error in decision making); Levine v. Wiss & Co.,
478 A.2d 397, 401-02 (N.J. 1984) (holding that the court-appointed account-
ants who evaluated the value of a business were not entitled to arbitral im-
munity because they were merely acting as assessors, not decision makers).
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tractual obligations with the parties, or improperly performed
duties with respect to the administration and oversight of the
arbitral process, immunity for arbitral institutions exceeds the
level of immunity the Supreme Court has recognized for judges
or other public officials. The result is an unjustified abdication
of contractual responsibilities to parties who relied upon the
provider's promised services.
The significant differences between the public judicial sys-
tem and the private world of arbitration, including the lack of
due process assurances in the latter, suggest that arbitral im-
munity ought to be applied carefully. No other private profes-
sional exercising difficult discretionary functions or services is
so immune.264 Particularly in the present environment where
powerful companies force many consumers and employees into
mandatory arbitration and the use of provider institutions,
blanket immunity undermines public confidence. If it is true
that "[a]rbitral immunity exists for the parties and the public,
not for the arbitrators themselves,"265 the public is better served
by a more restrained scale of arbitral immunity. Again, a quali-
fied standard of immunity, limited to arbitral decisional acts on
the merits of the substantive dispute upon which evidence was
presented, comports with the need to ensure finality of the un-
derlying arbitral award.266
B. OPTIONS FOR MEANINGFUL APPLICATION AND ENFORCEMENT
OF ARBITRAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND COMPLIANCE WITH CONDUCT
AND ETHICS STANDARDS
Absolute arbitral immunity impedes judicial enforcement
of arbitral conduct and professional ethics standards and pre-
vents redress for parties injured by arbitral failures. Because
both the FAA and the doctrine of arbitral immunity limit re-
course by aggrieved claimants in the judicial system, other op-
tions to provide a mechanism for meaningful enforcement merit
consideration.
The following proposals seek to balance the policy justifica-
tions for arbitral immunity with the need to assure consumers
and the public that the process is not without any checks.
264. See supra note 218.
265. Dennis R. Nolan & Roger I. Abrams, Arbitral Immunity, 11 INDUS.
REL. L.J. 228, 237 (1989).
266. See also discussion supra Part III.A.3.
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Option 1--Judicial Analogy Status Quo: Rely on the Market
and Internal Oversight
Attempts to regulate arbitration may be viewed as burden-
ing a process that by design is intended to be the product of the
parties' private choice to relinquish traditional means of resolu-
tion and confer final and binding powers to the arbitrator.
Thus, one option is to keep the status quo. That is, maintain
broad immunity, trust that the process of self-regulation and
the goodwill of arbitrators and providers is working, i.e., that
the market will weed out those with unscrupulous or negligent
practices and reward those who adhere to standards of compe-tenc and " 267
tency and fairness. This option maintains the privacy, flexi-
bility, and process choice that make arbitration an attractive
alternative. The obvious limitation of this option is that most
consumer arbitration users, many of whom are subject to arbi-
tration through nonnegotiated form contracts, have only one
case, and the mere passage of time to obviate bad arbitration is
no consolation.
In this process, private arbitrators, not necessarily skilled
in the law, render final and binding determinations as to not
only the parties' contractual rights, but also statutory rights
and liabilities, including the possibility of collective or class ac-
tion claims.68 Some arbitration participants have voiced frus-
tration, if not horror,2 69 and distrust the current process, which
is shielded from public and judicial scrutiny. A response is nec-
essary if consumer arbitration is to retain legitimacy in the
eyes of the public. At some point, people who find themselves
bound to arbitration, whether voluntarily or as a result of ad-
hesive mandatory arbitration contracts, must have assurance
that the players in the process are not above the law. Accord-
ingly, the apparent commitment to standards of process fair-
ness in arbitration must be accompanied by an enforcement
267. For example, some of the major provider institutions have selection
criteria that must be met in order to qualify to serve as an arbitrator on behalf
of that organization, and presumably an internal process for handling griev-
ances. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, STATEMENT OF ETHICAL PRINCIPLES, su-
pra note 32.
268. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. 2402, 2406-07 (2003)
(stating that the FAA does not preclude class action claims); see also
Sternlight, supra note 58, at 12-13.
269. See Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 938 P.2d 903, 922-24
(Cal. 1997) (reporting frustration with arbitrators' dilatory practices); PUBLIC
CITIZEN, supra note 16 (reporting the arbitration experiences of Stephanie
Hundley-Paul and others).
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mechanism. The effort by reputable arbitrator institutions to
promulgate and adopt standards of conduct and professional
ethics for arbitrators and providers is an important step, but
the missing link of adequate reporting and enforcement makes
this option only half the answer.270
Option 2-The Professional Services Analogy: Treat Arbitrators
Like Other Professions Subject to Public Oversight, Accessible
Grievance Reporting, and Perhaps Registration, Certification,
or Licensing
Other methods for monitoring quality and providing re-
dress to parties aggrieved by alleged arbitral failures involve
various elements of governmental regulation, such as through a
state board or commission overseeing the arbitration industry,
or through a registration, licensure, or credentialing process.
This option may be met with objection due to the private con-
tractual nature of arbitration. However, most professionals, in-
cluding judges,27' are subject to standards of conduct and public• .272
oversight. When one considers the purpose and process guid-
ing the regulation of other professions, the need to exempt arbi-
tration is not obvious.27 3 To protect the public, states regulate
many private professions through licensing or credentialing
processes and frequently provide accessible reporting or griev-
ance mechanisms. This permits consumers to report concerns of
misconduct or negligence by a variety of other professionals
working in the state.274 Arbitrators are not currently licensed,
270. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text (describing various eth-
ics codes for arbitrators and provider institutions).
271. The Commission on Judicial Performance monitors judicial perform-
ance and may impose a variety of punishments, from censure to removal,
when a judge acts inappropriately. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
(2002), supra note 116, at Preamble.
272. The California Constitution includes provisions creating the Commis-
sion on Judicial Performance. CAL. CONST. art. 6, §§ 8, 18, 18.5.
273. The previous examples provide illustrations of programs that provide
some form of reporting and investigating complaints about an ADR process.
For example, the California Business and Professions Code contains provi-
sions for the regulation of more than thirty-five different professions. These
professions include accountants, advertisers, interior designers, locksmiths,
contractors, private investigators, alarm companies, funeral directors, pest
control operators, land surveyors, lawyers, real estate agents, athlete agents,
chiropractors, dentists, dietitians, psychologists, physical therapists, optome-
trists, veterinarians, and social workers. See generally CAL. BUS. & PROF.
CODE (2003) (providing regulations for various professions).
274. For example, physical therapists are regulated under the Physical
Therapy Practice Act. Id. § 2600 et seq. Oversight for regulations of physical
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certified, or subject to specific standards for education, train-
ing, or experience.
A comparable means of oversight, grievance reporting, and
review as used for other professions should be considered in the
context of the growing private arbitration industry. A public
board monitoring arbitrators can enforce standards in ways
that private institutions and the courts (presuming broad im-
munity and FAA limitations) cannot. For example, a perma-
nent committee on Arbitrator Ethics at the state level could be
charged with monitoring complaints, ensuring that ethical
standards are effectively enforced, and ordering restitution
where warranted. Support for this option is found in similar
programs at the state or federal level, which have reporting
and grievance mechanisms to monitor the quality of court-
connected neutrals, attorneys, or other professionals.276 The
process for reporting grievances or ethical violations in arbitra-
tion can be straightforward, accessible, and not overly intru-
therapists is the responsibility of the Physical Therapy Board, within the
State of California Department of Consumer Affairs. The Board is responsible
for licensing those in the profession as well as for providing information to
consumers. When a consumer believes his or her "issue of concern is a viola-
tion of the Board's licensing laws or regulations," a complaint may be filed
with the Board. See PHYSICAL THERAPY BOARD, CAL. DEP'T OF CONSUMER
AFFAIRS, CONSUMER COMPLAINT PROCESS, at http://www.ptb.ca.gov/
enforce/consinfo.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2003). The Board's Web site provides
very user-friendly instructions on how to file such a complaint, and it includes
a downloadable version of the complaint form. Upon receiving the complaint,
the Board has authority to conduct a full and thorough investigation, and
where there is clear and convincing evidence of a violation, the Board may
take appropriate disciplinary action, which may include loss of license. Id.
275. Similarly, there are no specific standards for mediators, and there is
also a debate over quality control in the context of mediators. See Arthur A.
Chaykin, Mediator Liability: A New Role for Fiduciary Duties?, 53 U. CIN. L.
REV. 731 (1984); Michael Moffitt, Suing Mediators, 83 B.U. L. REV. 147 (2003).
276. Concerns about quality control of third-party neutrals in court-
connected arbitration or ADR proceedings have prompted some courts to insti-
tute programs, procedures, or court rules to permit reporting of grievances.
For example, the District of Columbia has a process in place whereby com-
plaints regarding the court-connected ADR process are heard before a
nonpresiding judge designated as the Dispute Resolution Compliance Judge.
U.S. DIST. CT. R. D.C. Appx. B. This judge has authority over complaints al-
leging that parties or neutrals engaged in misconduct or otherwise failed to
comply with court orders or to participate in good faith. Id. This program ap-
plies only to court-connected ADR proceedings and does not assist users of pri-
vate/contractual arbitration proceedings. Id.; see also Developments in the
Law-The Paths of Civil Litigation, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1851, 1874 (2000) (dis-
cussing the need for quality control of court-connected ADR neutrals).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol 88:449
sive. The benefit of instituting such a program for consumer
arbitration would be that parties who feel trapped by a per-
ceived unfair process have an accessible and inexpensive ave-
nue to report a grievance. This suggestion does not presuppose
that all such complaints and allegations of misconduct are ei-
ther legitimate or illegitimate, but promotes public confidence
that a fair review process is available. Adoption of such an
oversight program would require, however, an investment of
public fiscal resources and the creation of a state entity, unless
the oversight program is placed within an existing regulatory
scheme.278 Alternatively, establishment of a program whereby
arbitrators and providers voluntarily register with and agree to
abide by rules of arbitration conduct and protocol of an inde-
pendent, public, or private entity charged with receiving, inves-
tigating, and remedying arbitration-related complaints, i.e., a
277. For example, medical doctors in California are regulated by the Medi-
cal Board of California, which serves as the "agency that licenses medical doc-
tors, investigates complaints, disciplines those who violate the law, conducts
physician evaluations, and facilitates rehabilitation where appropriate."
MEDICAL BOARD OF CALIFORNIA, CAL. DEPT OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, at
http://www.medbd.ca.gov/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2003). The Medical Board's Web
site provides consumers with a large amount of useful information, including
applicable laws, services for consumers, and instructions for complaints. See
id. Once a complaint is filed, the Medical Board evaluates the complaint to de-
termine if a full investigation is necessary. MEDICAL BOARD OF CALIFORNIA,
CAL. DEP'T OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, How COMPLAINTS ARE HANDLED,
http://www.medbd.ca.gov/howcompweb.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2003). If an in-
vestigation confirms a violation, the complaint is submitted to the Attorney
General, who makes a formal charge and brings any appropriate disciplinary
action, such as suspension or loss of license. Id. Attorneys are regulated by the
state bar, which sets the guidelines for admission to practice law, sets the
standards for required education and training, and handles complaints and
disciplinary procedures. In California, the state supreme court and the state
legislature, as well as the courts in cases of malpractice, enforce the standards
of conduct and professional ethics for lawyers who practice in the state. See
CALIFORNIA STATE BAR, WHAT DOES IT Do? HOW DOES IT WORK 1-3 (2003), at
http://www.calbar.gov/calbar/pdfswhowhatl.pdf. The state bar has a complaint
process, and its Web site provides thorough information about this process,
advising users to "[riegister a complaint with the State Bar if [they] believe
that [their] lawyer acted improperly." Id. at 4.
278. For example, a state department of consumer affairs could review
complaints. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 101.6 (2003) (charging the state
department of consumer affairs with the oversight of licensed professionals,
including establishing minimum qualifications). The Department of Consumer
Affairs is also required to "[pirovide a means for redress of grievances by in-
vestigating allegations of unprofessional conduct, incompetence, fraudulent
action, or unlawful activity brought to their attention by members of the pub-
lic and institute disciplinary action ... [and to] conduct periodic checks of li-
censees, registrants, or otherwise certified persons." Id.
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"Better Arbitration Bureau," could promote confidence in arbi-
tration. Presumably, arbitration users would opt to select arbi-
tral actors who have made such a commitment.
Option 3-The Legislative Option: Statutorily Recognized
Qualified Immunity and Remedies
An option that would not require fiscal resources is legisla-
tive enactment of a statute that recognizes a standard of quali-
fied arbitral immunity and that articulates specific standards
of practice and remedies for conduct violations.279 First, defining
arbitral immunity as limited to decisional acts of the arbitrator,
taken within the arbitrator's jurisdiction, and in the absence of
intentional bad faith, comports with the judicial/administrative
distinction imported in judicial immunity determinations. 20 A
qualified immunity standard balances the competing policy
concerns of protecting arbitrators in their decisional roles while
holding arbitral providers accountable for their contractual,
statutory, and other independent legal obligations. 81 Such leg-
279. A qualified immunity standard is also used in the context of interna-
tional arbitration. See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION RULES art. 35 (2003) ("The members of the tribunal and the ad-
ministrator shall not be liable to any party for any act or omission in connec-
tion with any arbitration conducted under these rules except that they may be
liable for the consequences of conscious and deliberate wrongdoing." (emphasis
added)), http://www.adr.orgindex2.ljsp?JSPssid=15747&JSPsrc=upload\
LIVESITE \ RulesProcedures \ National\ International\.. .. \ focusArea\ intern
ational\AAA175current.htm. The standard for immunity under international
arbitration rules does not apply to conscious and deliberate wrongdoing. See
WIPO ARBITRATION RULES art. 77 (2003) (providing for exclusion of liability
for arbitrators and providers "[e]xcept in respect of deliberate wrongdoing"),
http://www.arbiter.wipo.intlarbitration/rules/miscellaneous.html. Other com-
mentators have also endorsed a qualified immunity standard. See Susan D.
Franck, The Liability of International Arbitrators: A Comparative Analysis
and Proposal for Qualified Immunity, 20 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1,
56-59 (2000); Sponseler, supra note 63, at 441-46.
280. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988) (holding that a state
judge who fired a probation officer performed an administrative function and
therefore was not entitled to judicial immunity from the resulting discrimina-
tion suit). Neither judicial nor arbitral immunity should extend to criminal
conduct. See O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 503 (1974) (citing Gravel v.
United States, 408 U.S. 606, 627 (1972)).
281. See supra Part III.B.1; see also Sponseller, supra note 63, at 441-43.
In comparison with the broader immunity that many U.S. courts appear to
grant arbitrators and provider institutions, the standard in international arbi-
tration is qualified arbitral immunity. See Franck, supra note 279, at 33-40.
Like other professionals, arbitrators should find it prudent and not onerous to
maintain liability insurance. See David I. Bristow & Jesmond Parke, The
Gathering Storm of Mediator & Arbitrator Liability, 55 DISP. RESOL. J., Aug.-
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islation should also provide an express remedy, such as fee dis-
gorgement, and the opportunity for an aggrieved party to select
a different arbitral provider to the extent arbitral failures in-
volved violations of ethical standards for disclosure of bias or
conflicts, or where an arbitral award has been vacated under
existing statutory standards.2"'
C. A PROPOSAL TO AMEND AND CLARIFY THE ARBITRAL
IMMUNITY PROVISION OF THE RUAA
States contemplating adoption of the RUAA should hesi-
tate to adopt the Act's provisions on arbitral immunity whole-
sale. The standard of immunity should be expressly qualified,
not absolute, and define coverage for judicial acts taken within
the scope of the jurisdictional limits to the arbitrator as
granted under the contract. Further, the statute should express
that independent claims, which do not relate to judicial acts,
are not barred. Importantly, the mandatory cost-shifting provi-
sion proposed by the RUAA should be eliminated as onerous
and abusive to the consumer. At a minimum, the RUAA should
contain a reciprocal provision providing for the disgorgement of
fees when a party has obtained vacatur of an award based on
arbitral misconduct or otherwise demonstrated a violation of
ethical standards.
CONCLUSION
The traditional notions of arbitration, involving parties of
relatively equal bargaining power who consent to having an ar-
bitrator of their own selection (who likely served as a volunteer
and determined only contractual interpretation issues), that
underlie the pro-arbitration policy of the FAA and the arbitral
Oct. 2000, at 23 (discussing the availability of arbitrator and mediator profes-
sional indemnity insurance). The authors note that "[t]o date, insurance pro-
vides liability protection at a relatively low premium cost. The fact that media-
tion and arbitration are considered relatively low-risk insurance activity does
not in any fashion negate the necessity of insurance nor does it suggest that it
should be overlooked." Id. For example, members of the ABA Section on Dis-
pute Resolution are eligible to apply for Arbitrator's and Mediator's Profes-
sional Liability Insurance, underwritten by Complete Equity Markets, Inc.
Joyce F. Clough, Claims Against Arbitrators and Mediators Are on the Rise,
Essay by Joyce F. Clough, Counsel, Lloyds of London, distributed with liability
insurance application materials (2002); COMPLETE EQUITY MARKETS, INC.,
ARBITRATORS AND MEDIATORS PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE (2002),
available at http://www.cemins.com/aba.html.
282. See, e.g., supra notes 30-33, 60 and accompanying text.
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immunity doctrine do not reflect the current reality of manda-
tory, predispute consumer and employment arbitration or of
arbitration as a profession and a potentially lucrative industry.
Because of important differences between judges and arbitra-
tors, arbitral immunity should be qualified, not absolute, and
limited to protecting the arbitral decision-making process from
reprisals by parties dissatisfied with the outcome. The justifica-
tion for extending arbitral immunity to provider institutions,
which by their own proclamation perform only administrative
tasks, does not align with the purpose underlying the immunity
doctrine. Thus, the general legal standards that apply to other
professionals should apply to provider institutions.
The time has come to reexamine arbitral immunity, to re-
quire accountability of arbitrators and provider institutions,
and to provide meaningful recourse to individuals aggrieved by
illegal conduct arising out of the arbitral process. State legisla-
tures considering the RUAA should give specific scrutiny to the
Act's broad arbitral immunity proposal. Rather than uncriti-
cally accepting absolute immunity as a given for arbitrators
and provider institutions, legislatures and courts should care-
fully examine the doctrine in light of modern arbitration prac-
tices and state responsibility to regulate businesses and profes-
sions. Qualified immunity provides a more appropriate
standard that protects arbitral decision making while not
shielding nondecisional acts, administrative acts, failure to fol-
low internal administrative or procedural rules, or egregious
misconduct, breach of ethics, fraud, or statutory violations. Op-
tions to provide oversight of, and redress for, arbitral failures
should also be seriously considered, lest public perception, jus-
tified or not, of private arbitration become entirely skeptical
and unaccepting of a viable form of dispute resolution.
